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ARTICLES
UNMASKING A PRETEXT FOR RES IPSA
LOQUITUR: A PROPOSAL TO LET
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION SPEAK
FOR ITSELF
WILLIAM R. CORBETT*
Has too much tort law been incorporated into the case law under the federal
employment discrimination statutes? The debate on this issue has been
reinvigorated by the Supreme Court’s decision in Staub v. Proctor Hospital.
In Staub, the Court referred to the Uniformed Services Employment and
Reemployment Rights Act, a federal employment discrimination statute, as a
“federal tort.” The Court then adopted the tort doctrine of proximate cause as
the standard for evaluating subordinate bias (or “cat’s paw”) liability. Staub
was not the first case in which the Court has suggested that a federal
employment discrimination law is a federal statutory tort, but it was the most
express and direct statement. Moreover, the Court’s adoption of proximate
cause, one of the most complicated, confusing, and criticized concepts in tort
law, to analyze a prevalent issue in employment discrimination law is striking
and provocative. Staub reinvigorates the debate about whether the Court and
courts have imported too much tort law into employment discrimination law—
the debate about the “tortification” of employment discrimination law.
Most discussions of tortification of discrimination law trace the origin to the
Supreme Court’s discussion of torts causation standards in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins. However, it actually began much earlier. The
* 2012 Frank L. Maraist Professor of Law, Paul M. Hebert Law Center of Louisiana
State University. I am grateful for a summer research grant from the LSU Law Center.
I thank Sandra F. Sperino, Charles A. Sullivan, and Michael J. Zimmer for reading
and commenting on an earlier draft.
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ubiquitous pretext analysis, developed by the Court to analyze individual
disparate treatment cases in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green is a
thinly veiled version of the tort doctrine res ipsa loquitur. Although there have
been numerous critiques of the McDonnell Douglas analysis that have called
for its abrogation, none have exposed it as the much-maligned tort doctrine.
Evaluating McDonnell Douglas as res ipsa helps explain its weaknesses and
shortcomings. After forty years of the pretext analysis, it is time to expel it from
discrimination law. Abrogating the McDonnell Douglas analysis should be
a significant first step in reconsidering the tortification of employment
discrimination law.
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“As one wit said: ‘If the thing speaks for itself, why doesn’t it talk
in English?’”1
[A]n act of employment discrimination is much more than an
ordinary font of tort law. The anti-employment discrimination laws
are suffused with a public aura for reasons that are well known.
Throughout this Nation’s history, persons have far too often been
judged not by their individual merit, but by the fortuity of their race,
their sex, the color of their skin, or year of their birth, the nation of
their origin, or the religion of their conscientious choosing. Congress
has responded to these pernicious misconceptions and ignoble hatreds
with humanitarian laws formulated to wipe out the iniquity of
discrimination in employment, not merely to recompense the
individuals so harmed but principally to deter future violations.
The anti-employment discrimination laws Congress enacted
consequently resonate with a forceful public policy vilifying
discrimination. A plaintiff in an employment discrimination case
accordingly acts not only to vindicate his or her personal interests in
being made whole, but also as a “private attorney general” to enforce
the paramount public interest in eradicating invidious
discrimination.2
INTRODUCTION
What if I told you that the most important analytical framework in
employment discrimination law is nothing more than a thinly veiled
pretext for one of the most enigmatic, vexatious, and controversial
doctrines of tort law? If I told you that the most basic and prevalent
analysis in antidiscrimination law really is one of the most distrusted
and marginalized analyses in tort law, would you be troubled? What
1. Stemme v. Siedhoff, 427 S.W.2d 461, 465 (Mo. 1968).
2. Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1234 (3d Cir. 1994),
vacated by 514 U.S. 1034 (1995).
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if I told you that the ubiquitous pretext analysis derived from
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green3 is actually a slightly retrofitted
version of res ipsa loquitur? Would you think that the very
foundational analysis of employment discrimination law had been
based on the best tort law had to offer or its dregs? This revelation
might help explain why current employment discrimination analysis
is confused and discredited.4 Perhaps employment discrimination
law should be detortified, at least in part, by returning res ipsa loquitur
to tort law, and thus permitting employment discrimination to speak
for itself without the artificial contortions of an ill-fitting analysis.
Employment discrimination law should abandon its most
3. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). The three-stage analysis, proof structure, or proof
framework for analyzing employment discrimination claims of intentional disparate
treatment was announced by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas, id. at 802.
The McDonnell Douglas analysis also is commonly referred to as the pretext analysis.
Since 1973, the McDonnell Douglas analysis has become pervasive in employment
discrimination law and beyond. A Westlaw search indicates that from January 1, 2011
to June 1, 2012, the case was cited in 3280 opinions in the federal courts and 202
opinions in state courts (search terms: “‘McDonnell Douglas’ w/10 Green” with date
restriction). It is used for Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA), and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Although the Supreme
Court has not definitively held that the McDonnell Douglas analysis applies to the
ADEA and the ADA, it has recognized, without disapproval, that the courts of appeals
apply the analysis in those contexts. See, e.g., Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S.
44, 49 n.3 (2003) (recognizing that the courts of appeals have used the analysis to
evaluate summary judgment motions in disparate treatment claims and applying it
under the ADA); O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 311 (1996)
(reserving the issue in context of the ADEA, but evaluating the case pursuant to the
framework). The McDonnell Douglas framework also is commonly adopted by courts
to analyze claims under state employment discrimination laws. See, e.g., Zaniboni v.
Mass. Trial Court, 961 N.E.2d 155, 158 (Mass. App. Ct. 2012) (stating that the
analysis applies to claims under Massachusetts employment discrimination law), cert.
granted, 967 N.E.2d 634 (Mass. 2012). Beyond employment discrimination law, the
pretext analysis has been adopted to analyze other types of federal and state
employment claims. See, e.g., Sabourin v. Univ. of Utah, 676 F.3d 950, 958 (10th Cir.
2012) (applying analysis to retaliation claim under the Family and Medical Leave
Act); Eagen v. Comm’n on Human Rights & Opportunities, 42 A.3d 478, 487 n.5
(Conn. App. Ct. 2012) (recognizing adoption of pretext analysis for various types of
state employment law claims).
4. Attorney Carter G. Phillips, in oral argument before the Supreme Court,
expressed the complexity of the employment discrimination proof structures: “I will
say in 25 years of advocacy before this Court I have not seen one area of the law that
seems to me as difficult to sort out as this particular one is.” Transcript of Oral
Argument at 29, Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009) (No. 08-441); see
also Martha Chamallas, Title VII’s Midlife Crisis: The Case of Constructive Discharge, 77 S.
CAL. L. REV. 307, 307, 309 (2004) (stating that the statutes do not define
“discrimination,” that “Title VII law has never been easy,” and that “[a]fter more
than a decade of litigation under the revised [1991] Act, . . . Title VII law has never
been more complex and confusing”); Sandra F. Sperino, Rethinking Discrimination
Law, 110 MICH. L. REV. 69, 71 (2011) [hereinafter Sperino, Rethinking] (positing that
the rigid proof structures that control employment discrimination law have “led to
doctrinal, procedural, and theoretical confusion within employment discrimination
law and . . . mired the field in endless questions about frameworks rather than in
addressing the field’s core issues”).
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fundamental analysis—the McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis; this
monumental step would immeasurably improve employment
discrimination law. It also might provide an impetus to consider the
larger issue of whether transplanted tort law has become too
prevalent in employment discrimination law and has eroded to some
extent the original public policy and civil rights foundations of that
body of law.
Almost half a century ago, Congress began enacting federal statutes
intended to address one of the most important civil rights issues—
employment discrimination. Given the history of discrimination in
this nation, it would be difficult to imagine a more important public
policy.5 However, Congress largely left to the courts the task of
fleshing out the lean statutory language with doctrine and principles
regarding proof of violations.6 With such a mission, courts could
create legal principles and doctrine out of whole cloth or they could
turn to existing bodies of law to borrow principles and doctrines,7
5. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 87-1370, at 2 (1962) (“Clear enunciation and
implementation of a national policy on equal employment opportunity are obviously
long overdue at this point in the history of the United States.”); Cheryl Krause
Zemelman, Note, The After-Acquired Evidence Defense to Employment Discrimination
Claims: The Privatization of Title VII and the Contours of Social Responsibility, 46 STAN. L.
REV. 175, 189 (1993) (“Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in an attempt to
assuage a national crisis. . . . Recognizing that discrimination injured the country as
a whole, Congress passed Title VII to achieve broad social goals.”). There may be no
more eloquent statement of the objectives of Title VII than that proclaimed by the
Third Circuit in Mardell, 31 F.3d at 1234. See supra text accompanying note 2.
6. For an interesting discussion of Congress’s delegation of the interpretive role
for Title VII to the courts and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC), see Margaret H. Lemos, The Consequences of Congress’s Choice of Delegate:
Judicial and Agency Interpretations of Title VII, 63 VAND. L. REV. 363 (2010). Professor
Lemos discusses the political battle over whether the principal interpretive role
would be delegated to the courts or the EEOC. She notes that ultimately Congress
weakened the enforcement authority of the new EEOC and therefore delegated a
larger interpretive role to the courts. Id. at 385–86. Professor Suzanna Sherry posits
that when Congress does not supply factual underpinnings for legislation in either
the statutes or the legislative history, the Supreme Court supplies the foundational
assumptions that inform the implementing doctrines.
See Suzanna Sherry,
Foundational Facts and Doctrinal Change, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 145, 161.
7. However, resort to common law sources is not necessarily an apt choice. See
Sandra F. Sperino, Discrimination Statutes, the Common Law, and Proximate Cause, 2013
U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 34 [hereinafter Sperino, Discrimination Statutes] (“[I]t is unclear why
judges would look to the common law to define terms in a statutory regime that is
not generally drawn from the common law and that does not mimic the common law
. . . .”); cf. Robert Belton, Causation in Employment Discrimination Law, 34 WAYNE L.
REV. 1235, 1242 (1988) (“Since the national policy against discrimination in
employment is not based on the common law, a strong argument can be made that
causal analysis should not be as critical an element in employment discrimination law
as it is in the law of negligence.” (footnotes omitted)). The propriety and balance of
importing common law doctrines to develop law under the employment
discrimination statutes is a topic that merits separate treatment. For now, it is
important to note that courts should recognize some tension, and in some cases,
incongruence of purpose between some common law principles and employment
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making adjustments to adapt the transplanted law to the objective of
combating employment discrimination. In practice, the courts both
created and borrowed.8 The courts had several options of substantive
bodies of law from which to borrow principles and adapt them to the
law of employment discrimination, including contract, constitutional,
agency, property, and tort law. While courts have imported doctrine
and principles from several bodies of law,9 courts have most often
turned to tort law.10
Although many of the concepts, principles, and doctrines of tort
law have proven useful in the context of employment discrimination,
it is important to balance the different objectives of tort law on the
one hand with the goals of public policy statutes such as the laws
addressing employment discrimination on the other.11 Some torts
discrimination law. Indeed, some common law principles will be antithetical to
employment discrimination law. For example, Professor Richard Epstein recognizes
that the employment discrimination laws are diametrically opposed to the commonlaw based principle of employment at will. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN
GROUNDS:
THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 3 (1992).
Commentators have made the case against a common law “baseline” for employment
discrimination law. See, e.g., Theodore Y. Blumoff & Harold S. Lewis, Jr., The Reagan
Court and Title VII: A Common-Law Outlook on a Statutory Task, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1, 70
(1990) (discussing the “inherent[] inconsist[ency]” of survival of “common-law
economic and political premises in light of a statutory scheme” that significantly
impinges on employment at will).
8. Regarding the courts’ creation of new law, consider for example, the
development of the disparate impact theory of employment discrimination. See infra
Part I.B.
9. See, e.g., Richard Michael Fischl, Rethinking the Tripartite Division of American
Work Law, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 163, 171 (2007) (noting “the ‘background’
rules of contract, tort, and property [that] have emerged to play a vital role in the
application of the statutes and doctrines that govern employment discrimination . . .
cases”). For example, the Supreme Court has used agency law principles in
determining when employers should be liable for sexual harassment. See Burlington
Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477
U.S. 57 (1986). In developing a proof structure for cases involving direct evidence of
discrimination, the Court turned to the mixed-motives framework developed in the
context of a public employee’s asserting a violation of first amendment rights. Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 229 (1989) (plurality opinion) (adopting the
framework developed in Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S.
274 (1977)). As will be discussed below, however, one of the most divisive issues in
the splintered Price Waterhouse decision was the standard of causation, and that issue
prompted debate about various tort standards of causation that could be
incorporated in the Mt. Healthy analysis. See infra Part I.D.
10. See, e.g., Michael J. Frank, The Social Context Variable in Hostile Environment
Litigation, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 437, 519 (2002) (stating that “the courts have
frequently looked to common-law tort doctrines to create the common law of Title VII”).
11. See, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 72 (adapting agency law principles to
employer liability for sexual harassment, the Court noted that “such common-law
principles may not be transferable in all their particulars to Title VII”); see also David
Benjamin Oppenheimer, Exacerbating the Exasperating: Title VII Liability of Employers for
the Sexual Harassment Committed by Their Supervisors, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 66, 93 (1995)
(contending that “[s]exual harassment is not merely a common-law tort, such as
assault, battery, defamation, or intentional infliction of emotional distress; it is also a
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concepts and principles might work well if modified, while still others
might not be sufficiently adaptable. Thus, courts should have
exercised caution in adopting elements of tort law that are not
adaptable to the law of employment discrimination.12 Almost fifty
years after the enactment of the first antidiscrimination law, case law
has imported a large volume of torts principles and doctrine,
including the principles of cause in fact, proximate cause, and res
ipsa loquitur.13 More important than the volume is the centrality of
imported tort law in the corpus of employment discrimination law.
For example, much of the core of individual disparate treatment
law—the most important theory of employment discrimination
law14—is founded on torts standards of causation and the res ipsa
loquitur doctrine.15 Indeed, the Supreme Court recently starkly
declared in Staub v. Proctor Hospital16 that an employment
discrimination statute is a federal tort.17 The Staub Court then
proceeded to adopt one of the most complicated and criticized
principles of tort law as the standard to resolve the common
employment discrimination issue presented in the case.18
Over the years, some scholars have questioned whether the
“tortification” of employment discrimination law is an appropriate
evolution for a body of civil rights and public policy law.19 Now it is
important to consider whether this body of law has become too
dominated by imported tort law that has been insufficiently adapted
to achieve the public policy purposes of the employment
discrimination statutes. While the Court’s recent proclamation in
Staub that an employment discrimination statute is a federal statutory
tort and its consequent incorporation of more tort doctrine have

statutory wrong for which Congress has provided free government investigations,
federal jurisdiction, and attorneys’ fees as well as legal damages”).
12. Professor Sperino distinguishes between importation of “pure common law”
and common law doctrine that is adjusted to the particular employment
discrimination law. See Sperino, Discrimination Statutes, supra note 7, at 45.
13. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
14. See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977)
(declaring that “[u]ndoubtedly disparate treatment was the most obvious evil
Congress had in mind when it enacted Title VII”).
15. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
16. 131 S. Ct. 1186 (2011).
17. Id. at 1191.
18. Id. at 1192 (determining that a supervisor’s act must be the proximate cause
of the adverse employment action for his discriminatory intent to be attributed to the
employer when a subsequent decisionmaker implements the adverse employment
action).
19. See, e.g., Sperino, Discrimination Statutes, supra note 7, at 2; Charles A. Sullivan,
Tortifying Employment Discrimination, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1431, 1434 (2012) [hereinafter
Sullivan, Tortifying]; Zemelman, supra note 5, at 177.
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captured the attention and concern of employment discrimination
scholars, it is just the latest occurrence in the ongoing and escalating
tortification.20 It follows just two years after the Court in Gross v. FBL
Financial Services, Inc.,21 to the surprise of many, rejected application
of the mixed-motives proof framework under the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act and concomitantly entrenched but-for causation,
the most plaintiff-hostile torts cause-in-fact standard in general use, as
the interpretation of the statutory language “because of . . . age.”22
The McDonnell Douglas analysis, one of employment discrimination
law’s oldest and most firmly established doctrines, has never been
impugned for its “tortiness.” While it has been the subject of
extensive criticism,23 the tort lineage of the McDonnell Douglas
framework rarely has been discussed in scholarly criticism.24 This
Article argues that the McDonnell Douglas pretext proof structure is a
thinly veiled version of res ipsa loquitur,25 and that fact is significant

20. See Sperino, Discrimination Statutes, supra note 7, at 17; Sullivan, Tortifying,
supra note 19, at 1432–34.
21. 557 U.S. 167 (2009).
22. Id. at 180. Gross is discussed infra Part I.D.
23. Criticism of McDonnell Douglas is almost as ubiquitous and unabating over the
years as use of the framework itself is in the case law. See, e.g., Judith Olans Brown et
al., Some Thoughts About Social Perception and Employment Discrimination Law: A Modest
Proposal for Reopening the Judicial Dialogue, 46 EMORY L.J. 1487, 1527 n.182 (1997)
(agreeing with the premise that the Court abandon the McDonnell Douglas analysis);
Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Getting It Right: Uncertainty and Error in the New Disparate
Treatment Paradigm, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1, 5 (1996) (suggesting the Court should
reconsider using the McDonnell Douglas analysis and offering suggestions for
alternative methodologies); Kenneth R. Davis, The Stumbling Three-Step, Burden-Shifting
Approach in Employment Discrimination Cases, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 703, 704–05 (1995)
(describing criticism of the McDonnell Douglas analysis as the Court’s usurping the
role of Congress); Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After
Hicks, 93 MICH. L. REV. 2229, 2259 (1995) (discussing the shortfalls of the McDonnell
Douglas analysis in addressing discrimination); George Rutherglen, Reconsidering
Burdens of Proof: Ideology, Evidence, and Intent in Individual Claims of Employment
Discrimination, 1 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 43, 43–44 (1993) (describing the decreasing
significance of the McDonnell Douglas analysis); Stephen W. Smith, Title VII’s National
Anthem: Is There a Prima Facie Case for the Prima Facie Case?, 12 LAB. LAW. 371, 371
(1997) (exploring whether the McDonnell Douglas analysis is useful).
24. Current scholarly discussions are focusing on other tortifications of
employment discrimination law but not the McDonnell Douglas framework. See, e.g.,
Sperino, Rethinking, supra note 4; Sullivan, Tortifying, supra note 19.
25. See Burns v. AAF-McQuay, Inc., 96 F.3d 728, 732 (4th Cir. 1996) (describing
the McDonnell Douglas analysis as “a cousin of res ipsa loquitur”); Robert Brookins,
Hicks, Lies, and Ideology: The Wages of Sin Is Now Exculpation, 28 CREIGHTON L. REV.
939, 982 n.258 (1995) (stating that “[t]he pretextual channel resembles the res ipsa
loquitur model in the law of torts”); William R. Corbett, An Allegory of the Cave and the
Desert Palace, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 1549, 1564 (2005); Ruth Gana Okediji, Status Rules as
Discrimination in a Post-Hicks Environment, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 49, 85 (1998)
(observing that “the Hicks majority’s explanation of the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine
procedural framework strongly echoes the res ipsa loquitur procedural framework”);
Sherry, supra note 6, at 164 (stating that “McDonnell Douglas essentially applies the
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because it is a tort doctrine that perhaps never should have been
imported into employment discrimination law. Regardless of the
propriety of the importation of res ipsa loquitur into employment
discrimination law in 1973, courts have not adequately modified the
McDonnell Douglas framework to serve the public policy objectives
behind the employment discrimination laws. Moreover, “res ipsa
McDonnell Douglas,” which is based on the persuasiveness of
assumptions supporting an inference, has not been substantially or
adequately revised over its forty-year life to reflect changes in the
occurrence of discrimination in the workplace or changes in societal
views about the occurrence of employment discrimination. Thus,
using analysis akin to res ipsa loquitur in employment discrimination
law has become not just unhelpful, but an impediment to proving
discrimination in many disparate treatment claims and an obstacle to
improving and updating the analytical tools of employment
discrimination law.
With the tortification of employment discrimination law having
reached a new level of audacity in Staub v. Proctor Hospital, now is an
opportune time to unmask McDonnell Douglas as almost unexpurgated
tort law that has been foisted upon employment discrimination law.
Notwithstanding its pervasiveness and popularity with the courts, the
res ipsa loquitur of employment discrimination law has not yet
achieved statutory enshrinement,26 although future codification is by
no means farfetched.27 If the tort origins and foundations of the
pretext analysis could be used to undermine it while it is common-law
based, such a monumental development might advance a dialogue
about the larger topic of importing tort law into employment
discrimination law.28 While employment discrimination law still

doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to employment discrimination: merely failing to hire
(or firing) speaks for itself as evidence of discriminatory intent”).
26. See Sperino, Rethinking, supra note 4, at 105 (stating that “McDonnell Douglas is
not codified in any statutory language”).
27. Consider, for example, the Protecting Older Workers Against Discrimination
Act, the legislation introduced in 2009 and again in 2012 to overturn Gross v. FBL
Financial Services, Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009). S. 2189, 112th Cong. (2012); S. 1756,
111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 3721, 111th Cong. (2009). The bills would have codified
the McDonnell Douglas evidentiary framework by providing that plaintiffs asserting
employment discrimination claims under Title VII, the ADEA, the ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 “may demonstrate an unlawful practice through any
available method of proof, including the analytical framework set out in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green.” S. 2189 § 2(b)(3)(C).
28. Commentators referring to the “tortification” of employment discrimination
law almost invariably are using the term in a pejorative sense, but there is much
about tort law that is good and useful. Cf. RED HOT CHILI PEPPERS, Californication, on
CALIFORNICATION (Warner Bros. Records 1999). The adoption and adaptation of tort
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retains some of its civil rights and public policy aura, it is time to
reclaim some of that ground by acknowledging that tort principles
and constructs should not so readily be imported into employment
discrimination law.
Part I of this Article discusses the changing perception of the
employment discrimination laws—how and why the laws have come
to be viewed as federal torts. Part I also considers some of the
incorporations of tort law into employment discrimination law that
have constituted the “tortification” of the law. Part II critically
examines the McDonnell Douglas or pretext analysis as an adoption of
res ipsa loquitur. Part II then contrasts that adoption of tort law with
more innovative employment discrimination principles, standards,
and proof frameworks created by the Supreme Court and Congress.
Part III proposes the abrogation of the “res ipsa McDonnell Douglas”
analysis’s dominance in employment discrimination law. That part
demonstrates how poorly res ipsa loquitur accommodates analysis of
employment discrimination claims. Res ipsa loquitur means, “the
thing speaks for itself,” but by using this analysis in employment
discrimination cases, courts are letting an ill-fitting tort doctrine
“speak for” employment discrimination law. Courts should strip away
the tort pretext to truly let employment discrimination speak for
itself. Casting off McDonnell Douglas’s vexing analysis, which is itself a
mere pretext for res ipsa loquitur, would be a good first step in
reversing the almost haphazard tortification of employment
discrimination law.
I.

THE TORTIFICATION OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW

A. Staub—Tortification of Employment Discrimination Law Reaches
its Zenith
When Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196429 was enacted,
neither Congress nor the Supreme Court would have characterized
the federal employment discrimination law as a statutory tort. Title
VII was primarily a public policy and civil rights statute aimed at
eradicating, in the employment setting, the most socially caustic and
destructive forms of discrimination that had blighted the nation

law in employment discrimination law has not always been bad, and future
incorporations need not be bad.
29. Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to
2000e-17 (2006)).
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throughout its history.30
Since early in the employment
discrimination law era, however, the courts, and to a lesser extent
Congress, have vigorously infused discrimination law with the
principles of tort law.31 During its 2011-2012 Term, the Supreme
Court moved farther down the road of re-conceptualizing the
federal employment discrimination laws as federal torts rather than
broad public policy statements regarding civil rights. In Staub, the
Court, adopting a standard for subordinate bias or “cat’s paw”
liability,32 stated that “when Congress creates a federal tort it adopts
the background of general tort law.”33 Although the Court was
analyzing the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment
Rights Act of 199434 (USERRA), the Court clearly was suggesting
that Title VII and the other employment discrimination laws are
federal torts as well.35

30. See supra note 5 and accompanying text; see also Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans,
441 U.S. 750, 756 (1979) (stating that “the ADEA and Title VII share a common
purpose, the elimination of discrimination in the workplace”); H.R. REP. NO. 88-914,
pt. 1, at 18 (1963) (stating Title VII’s purpose to eliminate discrimination).
31. It is interesting to note that this importation of law is not a one-way street.
Professor Martha Chamallas writes of the “degree to which the concepts and values
of civil rights law have migrated or can be expected to migrate into tort law.” Martha
Chamallas, Discrimination and Outrage: The Migration from Civil Rights to Tort Law, 48
WM. & MARY L. REV. 2115, 2118 (2007).
32. The Court explained the issue as follows: “[plaintiff] sought to hold his
employer liable for the animus of a supervisor who was not charged with making the
ultimate employment decision.” Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1190
(2011). The Court also explained the origin of the term “cat’s paw.” Id. at 1190 n.1
(noting that the term arose from a fable written by Aesop in which a monkey induces
a cat by flattery to take roasting chestnuts from a fire and, when the cat burns its
paws, the monkey runs off with the chestnut).
33. Id. at 1191.
34. Pub. L. No. 103-353, 108 Stat. 3149 (codified at 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301–4334
(2006)).
35. The principle that the Court was discussing in Staub, subordinate bias liability
or cat’s paw liability, is a general discrimination issue that arises under all of the
employment discrimination laws. The USERRA case appears to have served as a
vehicle to resolve the issue for employment discrimination law generally. But see
Holliday v. Commonwealth Brands, Inc., 483 F. App’x 917, 922 n.2 (5th Cir. Aug. 3,
2012) (per curiam) (suggesting that when Staub is considered in conjunction with
Gross, the Staub standard may apply to only employment discrimination statutes with
“motivating factor” statutory language), petition for cert. filed, 81 U.S.L.W. 3393 (U.S.
Dec. 20, 2012) (No. 12-764). Prior to Staub, the Court had granted certiorari to
resolve the issue several years earlier in a Title VII case that settled before the Court’s
decision. See BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of L.A. v. EEOC, 549 U.S. 1334, 1334
(2007). Moreover, among the three cases the Staub Court cited in support of the
federal tort proposition, one was a Title VII case: Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524
U.S. 742 (1998). Staub, 131 S. Ct. at 1191. The Court had not actually called Title
VII a federal tort in Ellerth; rather, the Court said, “Title VII borrows from tort law the
avoidable consequences doctrine.” Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764.

CORBETT.OFF_TO_WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

458

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2/28/2013 1:10 PM

[Vol. 62:447

The brazen statement in Staub was not the first time that the Court
has made such a statement about employment discrimination laws.36
Indeed, Justice O’Connor in her concurring opinion in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins,37 referred to Title VII as creating a “statutory
employment ‘tort.’”38 Even more telling than the Court’s use of the
tort label in Staub was the Court’s adoption of the tort concept of
proximate cause, one of the most maligned principles of tort law39 as
the test for deciding when to attribute the discriminatory motive of a
subordinate to a superior.40 The Court had little reason to invoke
proximate cause in Staub.41 More broadly, proximate cause seems an
unusual concept to invoke in employment discrimination law.42
While the cause-in-fact tort standards have created numerous
problems in employment discrimination law, the nebulous concept of

36. See Sullivan, Tortifying, supra note 19, at 1433 (“Although Title VII has often
been described as creating a statutory tort, the panoply of tort doctrines has been
applied to this statutory scheme only sporadically and then often in forms influenced
by specific statutory language of the law.” (footnote omitted)).
37. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
38. Id. at 264 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (sorting through torts
standards of causation to choose one for the mixed-motives analysis). As Professor
Bernstein chronicles, Justice O’Connor was the primary proponent of the thesis that
employment discrimination law is statutory tort law. Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual
Harassment with Respect, 111 HARV. L. REV. 445, 510 (1997) (stating that “her
colleagues on the Court have never effectively refuted Justice O’Connor’s cogent
position that employment discrimination is a tort in all but name”).
39. Dean Mark Grady, in the course of offering a defense of proximate cause for
its greater-than-appreciated predictability and cohesiveness, recognized that many
believe that proximate cause is basically incoherent and that its cases either cannot
be predicted or that they illustrate some fundamental disorder of the common law.
See Mark F. Grady, Proximate Cause Decoded, 50 UCLA L. REV. 293, 294 (2002); see also
Sperino, Discrimination Statutes, supra note 7, at 4 (quoting a leading torts treatise
regarding the disagreement and confusion about proximate cause); Sullivan,
Tortifying, supra note 19, at 1459 (stating that “[c]omplaints about the nebulousness
of the concept are numerous and longstanding, and there have been determined
efforts to eradicate it from legal discourse”).
40. Staub, 131 S. Ct. at 1187 (citing proximate cause as key to determining
liability). Many have decried the complexity, uncertainty, and other negative
qualities of proximate cause. Indeed, the dissatisfaction with proximate cause has
been so great that the Restatement (Third) of Torts replaces “proximate cause” with
“scope of liability,” explaining that proximate cause is a poor term to describe the
idea embodied in the term. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL &
EMOTIONAL HARM § 29 cmt. b (2010).
41. Sullivan, Tortifying, supra note 19, at 1455–58 (noting that regarding the
result in Staub, the invocation of proximate cause seems gratuitous).
42. Sullivan notes three reasons: (1) Proximate cause is “a notoriously
amorphous concept even in those areas in which it applies”; (2) proximate cause in
torts applies to negligence not intentional torts, and disparate treatment denotes
intentional discrimination; and (3) tort law has used proximate cause primarily for
physical injuries, not economic injuries. See id. at 1459. Even a commentator who is
generally favorable about Staub recognizes the uncertainty the Court left in its wake.
See Benjamin Pepper, Comment, Staub v. Proctor Hospital: A Tenuous Step in the
Right Direction, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 363, 367 (2012).
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proximate cause seems likely to be even more problematic. What
role will proximate cause concepts such as foreseeability, direct
causation, scope of the risk, eggshell skull, and intervening and
superseding cause have in employment discrimination law? As
troublesome as proximate cause has been in tort law, its adoption in
employment discrimination law does not bode well. It is difficult to
foresee where the adoption of proximate cause in employment
discrimination law will lead.43
Although the Court’s treatment of employment discrimination law
in Staub has been provocative,44 it is just the latest step in the ongoing
transformation of the employment discrimination statutes into
federal statutory torts. However, Staub represents a significant step
because the Court both unequivocally declared an employment
discrimination statute to be a tort and adopted one of the most
vexatious of all tort doctrines to address a common employment
discrimination issue.
B. In the Beginning
The tortification of employment discrimination law was not
imminent when the Supreme Court began interpreting Title VII and
developing the law. The 1971 case, Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,45 marked
the Supreme Court’s first significant encounter with Title VII.46 The
Griggs Court adopted disparate impact, an innovative theory of
discrimination advocated by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission.47
Under the theory, facially nondiscriminatory
employment practices and criteria that have a statistically significant
disparate impact on members of a protected class constitute illegal
discrimination, regardless of intent, if they cannot be justified by

43. Professor Sullivan posits that the Court may have been preparing to hold that
unconscious discrimination is not actionable because such discrimination does not
cause the harm. Sullivan, Tortifying, supra note 19, at 1459. Professor Sperino
predicts that “importing proximate cause principles into employment discrimination
law will further limit the reach of federal discrimination law, in line with already
conservative interpretations of factual causation.” Sperino, Discrimination Statutes,
supra note 7, at 3.
44. See, e.g., Sullivan, Tortifying, supra note 19, at 1445–58; Sperino, Discrimination
Statutes, supra note 7, at 43.
45. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
46. The Court decided one Title VII case before Griggs: Phillips v. Martin Marietta
Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (per curiam). The per curiam opinion reversed a
summary judgment on the issue of whether women not having preschool age
children was a bona fide occupational qualification for a job. Id. at 543–44.
47. See generally Susan D. Carle, A Social Movement History of Title VII Disparate
Impact Analysis, 63 FLA. L. REV. 251 (2011) (examining the history of Title VII
disparate impact law).
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their relationship and necessity to the job in question.48 Although it
has been argued that the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) created the disparate impact theory,49 Professor
Carle, in an insightful article, has traced the origins of the theory to
activists within the National Urban League who developed
“experimentalist regulatory strategies” in the early 1900s.50 No one
disputes, however, that the agency charged with enforcement of Title
VII played a major role in the development of and advocacy for
disparate impact,51 a legal theory that was not borrowed from tort law
or any other obvious common law source. In adopting the disparate
impact theory, the Court spoke in eloquent language about the
purpose of Title VII to combat both overt and covert forms of
discrimination.52 Through these observations, the Court noted the
lofty objective of Title VII.53
In contrast with the later adoptions and minor modifications of
tort law, disparate impact was innovative and expansive law, and it has
been controversial. Indeed, it was so innovative that some argue that
the Court reached beyond Congressional intent in enacting Title
VII.54 However, arguments regarding disparate impact’s questionable
lineage and its alleged inconsistency with Congressional intent were
rendered moot by Congress’s codification of a version of disparate
impact in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.55
48. See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
The definition and framework for disparate impact were codified in the Civil Rights
Act of 1991. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2006).
49. See HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT
OF NATIONAL POLICY, 1960–1972, at 249–54 (1990) (describing how the EEOC
initiated the interpretation of Title VII that the Court adopted in Griggs). But see
Robert Belton, Title VII at Forty: A Brief Look at the Birth, Death, and Resurrection of the
Disparate Impact Theory of Discrimination, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 431, 435 (2005)
(refuting proposition that the EEOC created the disparate impact theory).
50. See Carle, supra note 47, at 270–74.
51. See Lemos, supra note 6, at 398–99 (discussing the Court’s reliance on the
EEOC’s guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures).
52. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (noting that Title VII
“proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but
discriminatory in operation”).
53. See id. (“What is required by Congress is the removal of artificial, arbitrary,
and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to
discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible classification.”).
54. See EPSTEIN, supra note 7, at 254–55 (arguing that the “disparate impact
theory” came out of the blue); Lemos, supra note 6, at 399 n.155 (stating that “[f]ans
and opponents of Griggs tend to agree that the decision is difficult to square with the
available indications of congressional intent”).
55. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2006). Although the battle about disparate impact’s
past is merely academic, the threat to its future viability is real, with both
commentators and a Supreme Court Justice positing that the disparate impact theory
may violate the Equal Protection Clause. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 594
(2009) (Scalia, J., concurring); Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate
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After Griggs was decided in 1971, one might have forecast that the
Court would develop the law of Title VII by being creative and
fashioning a new body of employment discrimination principles
rather than relying heavily on those imported from the common
law.56 However, the creative impulse exhibited in Griggs was shortlived and both the Supreme Court and Congress soon began to
tortify employment discrimination law.
The Court’s second
significant encounter with Title VII was in 1973 in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green.57
C. The Changing Perception of the Employment Discrimination Laws
The tortification of employment antidiscrimination law can be
viewed in two ways. First and more generally is the changing
perception of the laws. Second and more specifically is the
incorporation of specific tort concepts, doctrines, and principles into
antidiscrimination law with no, few, or inadequate modifications.
The first statements by justices on the Supreme Court analogizing
Title VII to torts and expressly adopting tort standards came in 1989
in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.58 Before considering the incorporation
of specific tort doctrines into employment discrimination law, it is
instructive to consider changing views of the employment
discrimination laws that have made resort to tort law seem apt and
natural. One view of the statutes is that they are manifestations of
public policy regarding civil rights, which attempt to eradicate and
deter the societal wrong of employment discrimination.59 While
compensation of individual victims’ personal injuries is an
appropriate goal of public policy and civil rights laws, it is not the

Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 493, 585–87 (2003); see also Eang L. Ngov,
When “The Evil Day” Comes, Will Title VII’s Disparate Impact Provision Be Narrowly Tailored
to Survive an Equal Protection Clause Challenge?, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 535, 588 (2011)
(concluding that disparate impact’s means of achieving its goals are not sufficient to
satisfy the narrow-tailoring requirement).
56. For further discussion of employment discrimination law crafted by the Court
rather than imported from common law and tort law, see supra notes 129–30 and
accompanying text.
57. Although none of the critics of the tortification of employment
discrimination law identify McDonnell Douglas as a significant step in the process, this
Article argues that it was. See infra Part II.B.
58. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239–42 (1989) (plurality
opinion).
59. See Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1234 (3d Cir. 1994) (“A
plaintiff in an employment-discrimination case accordingly acts . . . to enforce the
paramount public interest in eradicating invidious discrimination.”), vacated, 514
U.S. 1034 (1995).
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principal objective.60 Another view of the employment discrimination
laws is that they are essentially federal statutory torts, the primary
purpose of which is to compensate individuals for the personal
injuries they suffer as a result of discrimination.61 In the half century
since the passage of Title VII, the perception of the employment
discrimination laws among courts, commentators, employers, and the
general public has moved from the first view toward the second.
A strong critic of the tortification of employment discrimination
law, Cheryl Zemelman, expressed her assessment in 1993 that there
had been a marked shift from viewing Title VII as a statute
encouraging employer responsibility to prevent discrimination to a
compensatory statute, focused on repaying victims.62 Thus, Title VII
had become so privatized “that once unthinkable characterizations of
the statute now seem commonplace.”63
How did perception of the employment discrimination laws, a
group of public policy and civil rights statutes, so evolve? This
Section considers three things that either prompted or indicated a
shift in perception: (1) the enactment of section 1981a as part of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991; (2) the shift in the most prevalent type of
claims from those based on refusal to hire to those based on
termination; and (3) courts’ increasing restrictions on use of the class
action device in employment discrimination litigation, which has
been somewhat analogous to the restrictions placed on use of the
class action for mass torts.
1.

The enactment of § 1981a as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1991
The enactment of § 1981a64 as part of the Civil Rights Act of 199165
was a good and needed change in employment discrimination law.
60. The Court discussed the dual goals of deterrence or eradication of
discrimination and compensation in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421–
22 (1975). The Court identified the “primary objective” of Title VII as “achiev[ing]
equality of employment opportunities and remov[ing] barriers that have operated in
the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over other employees.” Id.
at 417 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429–30 (1972)). The Court
then went on to recognize that “[i]t is also the purpose of Title VII to make persons
whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination.” Id.
at 418; see also Zemelman, supra note 5, at 191 (“The primary emphasis on
deterrence, rather than compensation, is reflected in the language and judicial
interpretation of Title VII’s backpay provision.”).
61. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L.
REV. 917, 985 (2010) (“[L]egislatures enjoy the authority to fashion statutory torts—
relational wrongs that give rise to private rights of action. This is what statutes like
Title VII are all about.”).
62. Zemelman, supra note 5, at 188, 196.
63. Id.
64. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2006).
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Nonetheless, that change probably has contributed to the view of the
employment discrimination laws shifting toward statutory torts.
Section 1981a made capped compensatory and punitive damages and
jury trials available for disparate treatment claims under Title VII and
the Americans with Disabilities Act.66 The enactment of section
1981a brought more consistency and uniformity to the remedies
available for various types of discrimination, although the caps
preserved some of the inequality and inconsistency.67 Before the
enactment of section 1981a, plaintiffs with race claims had been able
to seek damages and have jury trials under Section 1981,68 and age
discrimination plaintiffs had been able to have jury trials and recover
liquidated damages under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967 (ADEA).69 Outside of race and age claims, the principal
monetary remedy available to other employment discrimination
plaintiffs was backpay.70 Under Title VII, before the 1991 Act, sexual
harassment plaintiffs who had not lost their jobs would often not have
recovered money other than attorney’s fees.71 The 1991 Act changed
65. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.).
66. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213.
67. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, pt. 1, at 64–65 (1991) (“An unfair preference exists
in federal civil rights law. Current civil rights laws permit the recovery of unlimited
compensatory and punitive damages in cases of intentional race discrimination. No
similar remedy exists in cases of intentional gender or religious discrimination.”).
The Civil Rights Act of 1991, as enacted, included caps on compensatory and
punitive damages. This amendment was a compromise to secure its passage. See S.
REP. NO. 102-286, at 2–3 (1992) (“In the interest of securing prompt passage of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 . . . Congress accepted the restrictions on damages, and left
to 1992 the task of providing full, fair, and equal remedies for victims of
discrimination.”).
68. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, pt. 1, at 74 (stating that in providing for damages
the Act “authorizes damage awards in Title VII cases in the same circumstances as
such awards are now permitted under 42 U.S.C. section 1981 for intentional race
discrimination”); see also Michael C. Harper, Eliminating the Need for Caps on Title VII
Damage Awards: The Shield of Koldstad v. American Dental Association, 14 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 477, 482 (2011) (stating that “Congress acted to at least mitigate
the disparity created by this set of legal developments by enacting a new section,
1981a”); Sandra Sperino, The New Calculus of Punitive Damages for Employment
Discrimination Cases, 62 OKLA. L. REV. 701, 709 (2010) (“[Section] 1981 provides a
federal remedy for race discrimination but does not contain the damages caps found
in Title VII.”).
69. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b).
70. As the Court explained before the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of
1991, “a plaintiff in a Title VII action is limited to a recovery of backpay, whereas
under § 1981 a plaintiff may be entitled to plenary compensatory damages, as well
as punitive damages in an appropriate case.” Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,
491 U.S. 164, 182 n.4 (1989).
71. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, pt. 1, at 64–69; Harper, supra note 68, at 481
(stating that Congress saw a need to provide additional remedies “in light of the
disparity between the legal damages the Court made available for race discrimination
in private employment through its interpretation of section 1981 and the limited
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that with the addition of capped compensatory and punitive damages
and thereby partially rectified a disparity among the types of
discrimination claims.72 There were very good reasons for Congress
to enact section 1981a, adding damages and jury trials for
discrimination claims that previously did not have those features, but
the addition of the damages also strengthened the compensatory
objective of the employment discrimination laws. That change, to
some, made them seem more tort-like.73
The Supreme Court suggested as much in a decision regarding the
taxability of an award of backpay under Title VII. In United States v.
Burke,74 the Court stated that “one of the hallmarks of traditional tort
liability is the availability of a broad range of damages to compensate
the plaintiff.”75 The Court responded to the argument that the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 changed the remedial provisions and thus made
Title VII claims “inherently tort-like in nature.”76 The Court
explained that although the availability of jury trials and
compensatory damages under the amended Act implies that
Congress has changed its view of the injury covered by Title VII, that
change could not be attributed to the pre-amendment statute.77
Thus, the 1991 Civil Rights Act’s amendment to add damages has
been viewed as bolstering the compensation objective of the
employment discrimination laws and making them more tort-like.
Although this view of the change in Title VII (and the Americans with
Disabilities Act) wrought by the Civil Rights Act is facile,78 it

equitable relief available for sex and other proscribed forms of employment
discrimination available under section 706(g) of Title VII”).
72. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 2(1), 105 Stat. 1071, 1071
(1991) (stating the congressional finding that “additional remedies under Federal
law are needed to deter unlawful harassment and intentional discrimination in the
workplace”); Chamallas, supra note 31, at 2142 (noting that “[t]he most important
change came with respect to remedies: for the first time, Title VII plaintiffs were
permitted to obtain jury trials and to recover compensatory and punitive damages, in
addition to monetary awards for backpay”).
73. See Zemelman, supra note 5, at 196–97 (positing that “because the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 now directly authorizes compensatory and punitive damages for Title VII
plaintiffs, numerous lawyers, members of Congress, and executive officers believe
that Title VII has become a tort statute”).
74. 504 U.S. 229 (1992).
75. Id. at 235 (ruling on taxability superseded by statute). The Court found that
“Congress’ decision to permit jury trials and compensatory and punitive damages
under the amended Act signals a marked change in its conception of the injury
redressable by Title VII.” Id. at 241 n.12.
76. Id. at 241 n.12.
77. Id.
78. It fails to take into account or give proper weight to the following: (1) the
dual objectives of the discrimination statutes; (2) the relationship between the two
objectives: the availability of compensation enhances deterrence; and (3) the
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nonetheless seems to have influenced thinking that the employment
discrimination laws became more tort-like with the enactment of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991.
2.

The shift from claims based on refusal to hire to claims based on
termination
A second development that has contributed to the view that the
employment discrimination laws have become more tort-like is the
shift over the years in the type of adverse employment actions
challenged in a majority of discrimination claims79 and the
interaction of that change with the predominant employment law
principle in the United States—employment at will.80 In the first
years after enactment of Title VII, most claims were based on refusal
to hire, but over the years the majority of claims have become
discharge claims.81 That shift should come as no surprise because
over the years employment opportunities became more open to those
to whom they had been denied in the past.82 However, the shift from
claims based on refusal to hire to claims based on terminations
brought the employment discrimination laws increasingly into
tension with employment at will, the basic governing principle for
employment termination in forty-nine of fifty states.83 Employment at
will provides that absent contractual, statutory, or other restrictions,
an employer can fire an employee for any reason—“good reason, bad
reason, or no reason at all.”84 Employment at will is a longstanding,
objective of Congress to address disparities in the remedies available among the
various types of discrimination.
79. Zemelman, supra note 5, at 193–94 (explaining that discrimination claims
have shifted from challenges to an employer’s failure to hire to challenges to
promotion or termination decisions).
80. See generally Andrew P. Morriss, Exploding Myths: An Empirical and Economic
Reassessment of the Rise of Employment At-Will, 59 MO. L. REV. 679, 696–703 (1994)
(describing adoption of the employment at will doctrine in each of the fifty states,
although Montana enacted a wrongful discharge law in 1987).
81. See, e.g., John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of
Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 1015 (1991) (noting that
“[h]iring charges outnumbered termination charges by 50 percent in 1966, but by
1985, the ratio had reversed by more than 6 to 1”).
82. See Donohue, supra note 81, at 1017 (positing that one possible reason for the
shift in the kinds of employment discrimination suits is that more women and
minorities move into better jobs).
83. See Scott A. Moss, Where There’s At-Will, There Are Many Ways: Redressing the
Increasing Incoherence of Employment At Will, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 295, 343 n.222 (2005)
(noting that forty-nine states are characterized as employment at will states). The
Montana Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act of 1987, which provides
employees with a cause of action for termination not for “good cause,” removes that
state from the list, although weakly. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to -914 (2002).
84. See Payne v. W. & Atl. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519–20 (1884) (“All may dismiss
their employes [sic] at will, be they many or few, for good cause, for no cause or even
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deeply entrenched, and fundamental principle of employment law in
the United States.85 When employees are terminated, many believe
their termination is wrongful or unjustified, they experience it as a
personal injury, and many want to sue their former employer for
“wrongful termination” or “wrongful discharge.” Yet, in a nation
dominated by employment at will, few plaintiffs can assert viable
claims for wrongful discharge.86
While most states recognize a tort denominated as wrongful
discharge in violation of public policy,87 the tort is ill-defined, and it is
notoriously hard for plaintiffs to recover under the tort theory.88
Unlike the feckless wrongful discharge tort, the employment
discrimination laws are the most significant source of legal protection
against unjust termination in the United States because a plaintiff
who can allege termination based on race, sex, or age often has a
viable employment discrimination claim. Employers, employees, and
courts understand that the most significant source of legal protection
against unjust termination in the United States is the employment
discrimination laws.
Thus, increasingly the discrimination laws have come to be
perceived as statutory wrongful discharge torts.89 Moreover, this may

for cause morally wrong, without being thereby guilty of legal wrong.”), overruled on
other grounds by Hutton v. Watters, 179 S.W. 134 (Tenn. 1915); see also Cynthia L.
Estlund, Wrongful Discharge Protections in an At-Will World, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1655, 1655
(1996) (recognizing the “employer’s presumptive right to fire employees at will—for
good reason, for bad reason, or for no reason at all”).
85. See Clyde W. Summers, Employment At Will in the United States: The Divine Right
of Employers, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 65, 66 (2000) (“To understand the American
system, therefore, it is necessary to understand the doctrine of employment at will, its
fundamental assumptions, and its ambivalence. More importantly, it is necessary to
recognize where that fundamental assumption has shaped our labor law.”).
86. See Estlund, supra note 84, at 1670 (describing the general problems of the
wrongful discharge model as grounded in the inherent difficulty of proving a “bad
motive” of the employer and the inequality of bargaining power between the
employer and employee).
87. See id. at 1662 (explaining that antiretaliation and antidiscrimination
doctrines are the basis of the “wrongful discharge” doctrine, which, like tort law,
requires proof of a specific wrong on the part of the employer).
88. See J. Wilson Parker, At-Will Employment and the Common Law: A Modest Proposal
to De-Marginalize Employment Law, 81 IOWA L. REV. 347, 393–94, 396 (1995)
(explaining that most states recognize a tort action for abusive discharge in
contravention of public policy, however, the unclear definition of the tort has
resulted in several approaches to the public policy justification for tort liability).
89. Cf. Timothy J. Coley, Contracts, Custom, and the Common Law: Towards a
Renewed Prominence for Contract Law in American Wrongful Discharge Jurisprudence, 24
BYU J. PUB. L. 193, 208–09 (2010) (stating that Title VII can be viewed as “a
representative wrongful discharge statute” because “it provides the basis for the most
commonly-litigated claims related to employment”).
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have led to a divisive view of the employment discrimination laws—
that the laws bestow job protection on “protected classes.”90
3. Increasing restrictions on the use of class action device in employment
discrimination litigation
A third matter evidencing the changing perception of the
employment discrimination laws is that the courts increasingly have
made class action suits difficult to maintain in employment
discrimination cases.91 This change is roughly analogous to the
restrictions that the courts have placed on the class action device for
mass torts,92 and evinces the perspective that employment
discrimination is, or has become, just another font of tort law. As
Professor Selmi explained in 2003:
[T]oday the lawsuits have largely become just another variation of
a tort claim where monetary relief is the principal, and often the
only, goal of the litigation. Along with this shift in emphasis has
come a dramatic change in our perspective on the persistence of
discrimination. There is no longer any concerted effort to
eliminate discrimination; instead, efforts are directed at providing
monetary compensation for past discrimination without particular
concern for preventing future discrimination, or even remedying
past discrimination, through injunctive relief.
For firms,

90. See Cynthia L. Estlund, The Workplace in a Racially Diverse Society: Preliminary
Thoughts on the Role of Labor and Employment Law, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 49, 81
(1998) (positing that some who regard themselves as non-protected employees may
believe that protected employees are getting preferential treatment because
employers must review adverse decisions carefully when dealing with what they
believe to be protected classes); Estlund, supra note 84, at 1679 (explaining that the
combination of antidiscrimination laws and at will employment practice may add to
the tension between what are regarded as protected groups and other employees
because the latter normally have no recourse against unfair terminations while the
former likely have a remedy under the antidiscrimination laws). In reality, Title VII
covers all races, sexes, etc., but employers and employees perceive the difficulty of
prevailing in reverse discrimination cases.
91. Zemelman, supra, note 5, at 194 (emphasizing that the Supreme Court views
discrimination not as a wrong against a whole class of persons, but instead as discrete
acts against an individual, and, while class actions may serve the rights of the
individuals that would otherwise not seek redress, the Court remains skeptical that
class actions suits could enforce these public rights).
92. See Sergio J. Campos, Mass Torts and Due Process, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1059, 1060–
62 (2012) (explaining that the class action device is disfavored for mass torts because
of problems such as a lack of commonality, a fear of losing autonomy, and a fear of
depriving due process rights of individuals); Douglas G. Smith, The Intersection of
Constitutional Law and Civil Procedure: Review of Wholesale Justice—Constitutional
Democracy and the Problem of the Class Action Lawsuit (Part II), 104 NW. U. L. REV. 787,
794–95 (2010) (describing the limitation on class actions for mass torts as based on
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, which states that the class action is inappropriate
where each individual would be affected in different ways, and the constitutional
principle of autonomy).
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discrimination, claims are now like accidents—a cost of doing
business, which necessarily implies that a certain level of
discrimination will persist.
One reason for the change in the nature of the litigation is that
employment discrimination class actions have evolved into a purely
private realm with little to no government oversight—indeed, . . .
with hardly any oversight at all.93

The increasing restrictions on use of the class action are a
If
significant limitation in employment discrimination law.94
employment discrimination is not an individual, isolated, and
sporadic phenomenon,95 then we would expect claims and litigation
to involve systemic claims. Moreover such approaches would be
needed to address effectively the type and scope of employment
discrimination that routinely occurs.96
Two theories of
discrimination, systemic disparate treatment and disparate impact,
address systemic discrimination.97
The EEOC believes that
addressing systemic discrimination claims deserves the agency’s focus
and resources.98 Systemic claims of discrimination often are pursued
using the class action device, yet courts increasingly have restricted
the availability of class actions in employment discrimination.99

93. Michael Selmi, The Price of Discrimination: The Nature of Class Action Employment
Discrimination Litigation and Its Effects, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1249, 1251–52 (2003).
94. See Melissa Hart, Will Employment Discrimination Class Actions Survive?, 37
AKRON L. REV. 813, 813 (2004) (discussing “the increasing skepticism—
particularly among members of the federal judiciary—toward the class action as
an effective dispute-resolution mechanism in the employment context is
beginning to take its toll”).
95. See Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural
Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 128 (2003)
(noting that “discrimination today rarely operates in isolated states of mind; rather, it
is often influenced, enabled, and even encouraged by the structures, practices, and
opportunities of the organizations within which groups and individuals work”).
96. Id. at 119 (explaining that as distinguished from individual disparate
treatment theory, systemic claims are often pattern or practice cases because they are
based on employers’ actions directed at members of a particular group).
97. See id. at 119–26 (discussing systemic disparate treatment); id. at 136–44
(discussing disparate impact); see also Michael J. Zimmer, Wal-Mart v. Dukes: Taking
the Protection Out of Protected Classes, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 409, 445–46 (2012)
(describing the primary differences between the two systemic discrimination
theories).
98. The EEOC launched its systemic initiative in 2006 and its Task Force Report
discussed its future plans in the EEOC’s 2012–2016 Strategic Plan. See LESLIE E.
SILVERMAN ET AL., EEOC, SYSTEMIC TASK FORCE REPORT 19 (2006), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/task_reports/systemic.cfm.
99. See Linda L. Holdeman, Civil Rights in Employment: The New Generation, 67
DENV. U. L. REV. 1, 56 (1990) (“The present Court operates from a highly atomistic,
individualistic view of society. Hence, it can support the claims of a plaintiff such as
Ann Hopkins in Price Waterhouse but is strongly disinclined to permit the problems of
racism and sexism to be addressed systemically by either legislation or lower courts.
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The Supreme Court’s 2011 decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Dukes,100 in which the Court disallowed certification of a sex
discrimination class of perhaps over a million and a half sales
associates, is the latest, and perhaps most significant, manifestation of
the limitation of class actions in employment discrimination law.101
In Dukes, female sales associates at Wal-Mart stores throughout the
nation sought class certification for their claims that Wal-Mart
engaged in intentional discrimination in denying women promotions
and in suppressing pay of women compared to men.102 In a five-four
decision, the Supreme Court held that a class action could not be
certified under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 23.103 The
majority gave several procedural reasons, and one was because class
actions are not available under Rule 23(b)(2) when claims for
monetary relief are more than incidental to claims for injunctive or
declaratory relief.104 The dissent agreed that certification was not
appropriate under Rule 23(b)(2), but opined that the certification
might have been possible under 23(b)(3), if not for the majority’s
finding that the requirements of 23(a) were not satisfied.105 Although
Dukes was a controversial decision106 and its effect in practice remains
to be seen, it is the latest evidence of the Court’s restriction on class
actions in employment discrimination cases.107
Discrimination issues are restricted to one-on-one showdowns, deciding who is right
and who is wrong.”).
100. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
101. See Scott A. Moss & Nantiya Ruan, The Second-Class Class Action: How Courts
Thwart Wage Rights by Misapplying Class Action Rules, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 523, 527 (2012)
(arguing that Dukes has altered the Rule 23(a) commonality requirement from one
that was a modest burden to one that is now a heavy burden on plaintiffs).
102. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2547.
103. Id. at 2561.
104. Id. at 2560.
105. Id. at 2561 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
106. Dukes has both its defenders and its detractors. Cf. id. at 2561 (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring). Compare Suzanna Sherry, Hogs Get Slaughtered at the Supreme Court, 2011
SUP. CT. REV. 1, 28 (criticizing plaintiffs’ attempt in Dukes to use the class action
vehicle to alter substantive employment discrimination law to include both implicit
bias and structural discrimination), with Melissa Hart, Civil Rights and Systemic Wrongs,
32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 455, 456 (2011) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s
decision in Dukes “brushed aside the systemic nature of the plaintiffs’ claims without
a word of analysis”), and Zimmer, supra note 97, at 447 (indicating that the Dukes
decision changed the law of systemic discrimination or at least foreshadowed
changes that will be made in future cases).
107. See Michael Selmi, Theorizing Systemic Disparate Treatment Law: After Wal-Mart
v. Dukes, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 477, 479 (2011) (stating that the practical
impact of Dukes is yet to be determined, but it will likely make it more difficult to
certify a nationwide class). Notwithstanding Dukes, there may be devices that
preserve and reinvigorate the availability of the class action in employment
discrimination, such as certification of a class “with respect to particular issues”
under Rule 23(c)(4). See McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
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The Supreme Court’s limitations on the use of class actions in
employment discrimination are analogous in some ways to the
restrictions on use of class actions for mass torts.108 Additionally,
some judges and commentators are concerned that the employment
discrimination class action has become too much like the tort class
action—largely private litigation with little oversight in which the
principal objective is compensation of the plaintiffs with much less
attention to deterrence.109
Over the half-century since the enactment of Title VII, the courts
have shifted employment discrimination laws to focus on individual
personal injury and compensation. This shift toward tort-like
application has removed the focus on the public policy behind
employment discrimination laws—deterring and eradicating
discrimination. This shift has resulted in courts, lawyers, and litigants
viewing the employment discrimination laws as “statutory torts.”
D. Importation of Tort Doctrines and Principles
As the general perception of the employment discrimination
statutes has shifted toward torts, the courts have tortified employment
discrimination by importing specific tort principles and doctrines
into discrimination law with varying degrees of modification. The
most prevalent, overarching, and practically significant incorporation
of tort law into antidiscrimination law is the adoption of tort
standards of causation as the means for understanding, proving and
analyzing the statutory prohibitions on discrimination.
The incorporation of tort cause-in-fact was discussed in the various
opinions of the badly splintered Supreme Court decision in Price
Waterhouse.110 The focal point of the debate was what causation
standard was invoked by Title VII’s statutory language “because of . . .

672 F.3d 482, 490–91 (7th Cir. 2012) (permitting class certification in an
employment discrimination case limited to particular issues under Rule 23(c)(4)),
cert denied, 133 S. Ct. 338 (2012); Hart, supra note 106, at 475 (discussing class
certification under Rule 23(c)(4)).
108. See Smith, supra note 92, at 794–95 (detailing the limitation on class action
suits in mass torts due to the myriad of legal and factual distinctions among
individual members of the class in mass torts that make class certification
inappropriate; as such, mass tort classes are generally unable to show the requisite
cohesiveness or predominance of common issues); see also Campos, supra note 92, at
1061 (discussing Dukes in the framework of mass tort class action suits, and noting
the concerns with litigant autonomy and due process rights).
109. See supra note 93 and accompanying text (detailing the changing perception
of employment discrimination laws).
110. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 264–66, 282–85 (1989) (plurality
opinion).
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race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”111 The plurality rejected
the idea that “because of” means but for causation.112 The Court,
borrowing a procedural framework from constitutional law, required
a two-step process. First, the plaintiff was required to prove—as the
prima facie case—that the relevant protected characteristic was a
motivating factor in the adverse employment decision. If the plaintiff
successfully proved the first step, the burden of persuasion then
shifted to the defendant to prove that it would have taken the same
action in the absence of a discriminatory motive (the same-decision
defense).113 The Court first developed this analysis in Mt. Healthy City
School District Board of Education v. Doyle,114 a case in which a
terminated public school teacher asserted a First Amendment free
speech claim.115 The plurality opinion in Price Waterhouse selected
“motivating factor” as the standard of causation in the plaintiff’s
prima facie case,116 whereas the Court in Mt. Healthy expressed the
standard as “‘substantial factor’—or to put it in other words, . . . a
‘motivating factor.’”117 Justice O’Connor’s influential concurring
opinion,118 argued that “because of” did mean “but for,” and she was
not willing to shift the burden of persuasion to the defendant
employer on the same-decision defense until the plaintiff satisfied a
more demanding standard of causation at the prima facie case
stage.119 Thus, Justice O’Connor’s concurrence selected “substantial

111. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006).
112. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 240 (plurality opinion). Twenty years later, a
majority of the Court repudiated the conclusion that “because of” does not mean but
for. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009).
113. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244–45 (plurality opinion).
114. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
115. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 248–49 (plurality opinion). The Price Waterhouse
Court also noted that it had approved such an analysis for a claim under the National
Labor Relations Act in NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983).
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 246–47 (plurality opinion).
In Transportation
Management, the Court approved the National Labor Relations Board’s reliance in
NLRB v. Wright Line, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), on Mt. Healthy in developing its
analysis of the plaintiff’s wrongful discharge claim. Mt. Healthy, 462 U.S. at 403–04.
116. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244–45 (plurality opinion).
117. Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287.
118. Appellate courts have relied upon Justice O’Connor’s concurrence to glean a
rationale for the Court’s application and interpretation of the mixed-motives
framework. See, e.g., Fernandes v. Costa Bros. Masonry, Inc., 199 F.3d 572, 580 (1st
Cir. 1999) (explaining that most courts believe that O’Connor’s concurrence is the
best method for addressing mixed motives cases), abrogated by Desert Palace, Inc. v.
Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003). But see Recent Cases, Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d
838 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 816 (2003), 116 HARV. L. REV.
1897, 1903–04 (2003) (arguing that appellate courts have relied on the wrong Price
Waterhouse opinion when discussing the mixed-motives framework).
119. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 266–67 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment) (explaining that plaintiffs have a high burden of proof at the first stage).
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factor,” treating it as a higher standard and not subscribing to the
interchangeability of “motivating factor” and “substantial factor” in
Mt. Healthy.120 Referring to the “statutory employment ‘tort’ created
by Title VII,”121 Justice O’Connor turned to torts case law to find a
suitable basis for shifting the burden of persuasion and relied on
Summers v. Tice,122 in which the California Supreme Court aided a
plaintiff shot by one of two hunters who could not prove which
breach caused the harm by shifting the burden to the defendants to
prove they did not cause the harm.123 She also cited another torts
case applying a shifting burden, Kingston v. Chicago & Northwestern
Railway Co.,124 a case of concurrent sufficient causes, in which one
cause of the fire damage was the railroad company’s negligence and
the other was an innocent or unknown cause.125 Thus, the Price
Waterhouse plurality and Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion
imported several tort cause-in-fact principles into employment
discrimination law, offering alternatives to the one-step but-for
standard.
The dissent in Price Waterhouse argued that the plurality was
incorrect, insisting that “because of,” “by any normal understanding,”
and as used “in everyday speech” does mean but for.126 But for is the
minimum standard used in common law approaches, the dissent
noted, citing tort law.127 The dissent then explained that the plurality
actually did, contrary to its protestations, adopt a but-for causation
test in two steps.128
Although the opinions in Price Waterhouse discussed tort causation
standards, what the Court created was a two-part analysis with a
shifting burden of persuasion that had no analogue in tort law.
Moreover, Congress’s subsequent modifications of the mixed-motives
analysis in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 preserved this burden-shifting

120. Id. at 265 (noting that Congress intended that plaintiffs show not only that an
illegitimate criterion be a substantial factor in the employment decision, but that the
illegitimate criterion actually caused the employment decision).
121. Id. at 264. O’Connor’s concurring opinion followed the “statutory tort” label
by noting the two primary functions of Title VII: the deterrence goal related to
public policy and the compensation or make-whole goal.
122. 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948).
123. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 263 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
124. 211 N.W. 913 (Wis. 1927).
125. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 263–64 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
126. Id. at 281 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also id. at 262–63 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (also arguing that the plurality was incorrect in
assuming that “because of” does not mean “but for”).
127. Id. at 282 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER
AND KEETON ON LAW OF TORTS § 9, 265 (5th ed. 1984)).
128. Id. at 285.
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in employment discrimination analysis, which differs from tort law.129
Congress also selected the ostensibly lower standard of causation—
“motivating factor”—rather than “substantial factor” for the plaintiff’s
prima facie case that triggers the shift in the burden of persuasion130
Thus, although the mixed-motives analysis incorporates tort
causation standards, the two-part analysis is drawn from other sources
of law, and Congress made adjustments in the statutory mixedmotives-analysis to accommodate the objectives of Title VII.
The adoption of tort standards of cause-in-fact in Title VII analysis
was the most significant tortification of employment discrimination
law because all analyses of intentional (disparate treatment)
discrimination focus on causation.131 The Price Waterhouse mixedmotives analysis was developed with the Court disagreeing about the
standard of causation to be applied. Regarding the other principal
analysis for individual disparate treatment claims, McDonnell
Douglas/pretext, the Supreme Court has not engaged in a protracted
debate or discussion about what tort cause-in-fact standard it
incorporates in pretext cases as it did with mixed-motives. The Court
has suggested, however, that the pretext analysis incorporates but-for
causation.132
The formula the Court developed for the statutory language
“because of” provides that discriminatory motive must be the causein-fact of the adverse job action.133 Many scholars have criticized
this incorporation of tort law cause-in-fact standards into the core of
intentional discrimination analysis.134 One commentator posits that

129. See Sperino, Discrimination Statutes, supra note 7, at 17 (explaining that
employment discrimination diverges from traditional tort law since the employer
wins only a partial defense to damages if the employer prevails on the second part of
the factual cause standard).
130. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244–45 (plurality opinion) (interpreting
legislative history of Title VII to require that a covered trait was the motivating factor
in the employment decision).
131. See, e.g., Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 177–78 (2009) (discussing
Price Waterhouse and finding that the burden of persuasion in an ADEA disparatetreatment case is on the plaintiff to prove causation and it never shifts).
132. See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 282 n.10 (1976)
(positing that the plaintiff is only required to show that race was a but for cause of
the discharge).
133. Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161,
1183 (1995) (noting that the Court’s formulation of “because of” requires triers of
fact to determine the employer’s mental state when the alleged discrimination
occurred).
134. See, e.g., Paul J. Gudel, Beyond Causation: The Interpretation of an Action and the
Mixed Motives Problem in Employment Discrimination Law, 70 TEX. L. REV. 17, 107–08
(1991) (arguing that the current causation standard is inappropriate in employment
discrimination cases).
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the formula is not apt because the analogy to tort causation is
flawed: Motives do not cause discriminatory acts; thus, “trying to
interpret human actions as if they were problems in causation is
fundamentally misconceived.”135 Similarly, other commentators
have argued that the causation formula fails to depict how the
phenomenon of discrimination actually occurs, as it often results
from unconscious or subtle bias.136
My critique of the tortification of employment discrimination law
does not end, however, with the propriety of adoption of tort
principles. It is one thing to criticize the Court for the importation of
tort cause-in-fact standards into employment discrimination law—the
most important and far-reaching tortification of discrimination law.
Nonetheless, the cause-in-fact standards are well-established, deeply
imbedded, and, in fairness, not far removed from the statutory
language. So, I do not expect the Supreme Court to adopt a new
approach to importation of tort law into employment discrimination
law and consequently abandon the cause-in-fact standards. However,
another facet of tortification is the possible modification of tort
concepts either at the time of adoption or over time to better achieve
the objectives of employment discrimination law. Even if one lauds
or accepts the Court’s adoption of cause-in-fact standards, the Court’s
trajectory in developing and adjusting cause-in-fact law in
employment discrimination has been far less impressive.
The most basic tort cause-in-fact standard, and the most onerous
for torts plaintiffs to satisfy, is but for causation.137 What emerged
from Price Waterhouse was a proof framework that, as the dissent
demonstrated, maintained but for causation.138 The shifting burden
of persuasion, however, was an innovative adjustment, which enabled
the plaintiff to move forward and even win the case by proving a
lower standard of causation at the prima facie case stage, subject to

135. Id. at 20.
136. See Green, supra note 95, at 131 (arguing that focusing on causation places
the emphasis on the individual rather than on the workplace environment); Krieger,
supra note 133, at 1168–77 (describing the Court’s formulation of causation and
intent under Title VII).
137. While sole or only cause is available, it is not generally used in either tort law
or employment discrimination law. For a recent case discussing the erroneous use of
“sole cause” in the circuit’s Title VII case law, see Ponce v. Billington, 679 F.3d 840, 846
(D.C. Cir. 2012) (banishing “the word ‘sole’ from [the circuit’s] Title VII lexicon”).
138. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 281 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (explaining that the plurality’s two-part analysis incorporates but-for
causation). But see id. at 240 (plurality opinion) (refusing to construe “because of” as
colloquial shorthand for but for causation).
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rebuttal by the defendant’s same-decision defense.139 As Justice
O’Connor noted, there were a few types of torts cases in which such a
variation on but-for causation was used. Thus, one could have been
optimistic at the time of Price Waterhouse and Congress’s adjustment of
the Price Waterhouse mixed-motives analysis that the Court and
Congress would appreciate the differences between tort law and
employment discrimination law and adjust the tort causation
standards appropriately over time as employment discrimination
cases arose that demonstrated the need.
The evolution of tort cause-in-fact standards reached its nadir in
2009. The promise of Price Waterhouse, the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
and innovative circuit court opinions, such as Rachid v. Jack in the Box,
Inc.,140 seemed to signal that Congress and the Courts would adjust
tort cause-in-fact to accommodate the objectives of employment
discrimination law, but instead the Supreme Court went in a different
direction in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc.141 In a surprising
opinion, the Court addressed an issue on which it had not granted
certiorari, holding that the mixed-motives analysis, with its shifting
burden of persuasion, does not apply to the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act. The majority opinion in the 5-4 decision insists
that the statutory language “because of” does mean but for
causation,142 and expresses distaste for the burden-shifting mixedmotives framework.143 The Gross decision, thus, retreats from the
innovative mixed-motives variation on but for causation and arguably
entrenches the but for standard in all employment discrimination
statutes that use only the “because of” language;144 this includes all
139. See id. at 258 (plurality opinion) (holding that after the plaintiff proves that
an impermissible trait, such as race, gender, or national origin, was a motivating
factor in the employment decision, the defendant may avoid liability only by invoking
the same-decision defense). Justice O’Connor provided two examples of common
law tort cases where a variation on but-for causation shifts the burden to the
defendants to prove that their action was not the but for cause of the plaintiff’s
injury: (1) “multiple causation cases, where a breach of duty has been established,”
and (2) cases “where the effect of a defendant’s tortious conduct combines with a
force of unknown or innocent origin to produce the harm to the plaintiff.” Id. at
263–64 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
140. 376 F.3d 305 (5th Cir. 2004). Rachid is discussed infra Part II.C.3.
141. See 557 U.S. 167 (2009).
142. Id. at 176–77.
143. See id. at 179 (stating that it is apparent that Price Waterhouse’s burden-shifting
framework is difficult to apply). For example, in jury trials it has been particularly
difficult for judges to explain Price Waterhouse’s burden-shifting framework through
jury instructions. Id.
144. Because the Court was interpreting “because of” statutory language, the
decision might render the mixed-motives framework inapplicable to all
discrimination statutes except Title VII, which also has the statutory “motivating
factor” language. See Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957, 961–62
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statutes except Title VII, to which the Civil Rights Act of 1991 added
“motivating factor.”145
The dissenting opinions in Gross disagreed with the majority’s
equation of but for with “because of” and its departure from both
Price Waterhouse and perceived congressional intent in the Civil Rights
Act of 1991.146 One dissenting opinion, written by Justice Breyer,
focused on the differences between tort law and employment
discrimination law, which justify application of different principles.
Justice Breyer’s dissent expressed that view as follows:
It is one thing to require a typical tort plaintiff to show “but-for”
causation. In that context, reasonably objective scientific or
commonsense theories of physical causation make the concept of
“but-for” causation comparatively easy to understand and relatively
easy to apply. But it is an entirely different matter to determine a
“but-for” relation when we consider, not physical forces, but the
mind-related characterizations that constitute motive.147

Gross remains the law despite protestations from a variety of
different interests.148 There was even an attempt in Congress to

(7th Cir. 2010) (finding that the Gross holding renders mixed motives inapplicable to
Americans with Disabilities Act). But see Smith v. Xerox Corp., 602 F.3d 320, 329 (5th
Cir. 2010) (refusing to extend the holding of Gross to the antiretaliation provision in
Title VII because the Gross court specifically refused to incorporate Title VII
decisions in its analysis). The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in a case in
which it may resolve the scope of the Gross holding. See Nassar v. Univ. of Tex. Sw.
Med. Ctr., 674 F.3d 448 (5th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 2013 WL 203552 (Jan. 18, 2013).
145. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006).
146. Gross, 557 U.S. at 180 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 190 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
148. Not surprisingly, the AARP did not like the decision. See David G. Savage,
Supreme Court Makes Age-Bias Suits Harder To Win, L.A. TIMES (June 19, 2009),
http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jun/19/nation/na-court-age-bias19
(discussing
how the Supreme Court’s conservative decision will make it harder for older workers
to bring successful age-discrimination claims because it eliminated the long-standing
two-step approach and replaced it with the requirement that plaintiffs “bear the full
burden of proving that age was the deciding factor in the dismissal or demotion”).
AARP attorney Thomas W. Osborne was critical of the decision, characterizing it as
one of several Court decisions suggesting that age discrimination is different from
other types and not as serious. See Susan J. McGolrick, Justices 5–4 Adopt But-For
Causation, Reject Burden Shifting for ADEA Claims, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 116, at
AA-1 (June 19, 2009) (noting that Osborne was “absolutely” surprised by “how far the
court went” in the Gross decision). Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Senator
Patrick Leahy stated as follows: “By disregarding congressional intent and the timehonored understanding of the statute, a five member majority of the Court has today
stripped our most senior American employees of important protections.” Id. at AA-3.
Senator Leahy further likened the Gross decision to the Court’s “wrong-headed”
ruling in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007), which Congress
overturned in the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009. Id. For other criticism, see
Kevin P. McGowan, EEOC Provides Guidance on Waivers, Hears Testimony on Age Bias
Developments, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 134, at A-14 (July 16, 2009) (noting that
outside witnesses criticized the Supreme Court holding in Gross at a July 15 EEOC
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overrule the decision by introducing legislation, the Protecting Older
Workers Against Discrimination Act.149 This frustration is not
unwarranted. Gross is among the most disappointing and alarming of
the Supreme Court’s decisions tortifying employment discrimination
law. Having demonstrated its facility with adapting torts standards to
the objectives of employment discrimination law, the Court did not
do that in Gross. Rather, the Gross Court limited innovations and
reverted to the most basic causation standard, which is also the most
onerous for plaintiffs to satisfy.150 This is not a propitious trajectory
for the management of transplanted tort doctrine.
A further incorporation of tort law into employment
discrimination law, although less express, is the Supreme Court’s
recognition of hostile environment sexual harassment as a covered
type of employment discrimination in Meritor Savings Bank v.
Vinson.151 The harassment theory, particularly hostile environment,152
is very tort-like,153 focusing on the dignitary harm that results from
the discrimination.154 The Supreme Court, in developing the
employer’s affirmative defense to liability for supervisor sexual
harassment in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,155 invoked the tort
doctrine of avoidable consequences.156 Harassment theory has
expanded the types of conduct and resulting injuries for which
plaintiffs may seek recovery under employment discrimination law,
and it is an area of employment discrimination that is very tort-like.
The foregoing are some of the most salient examples of tort law
being imported into employment discrimination law. Although there
are other examples,157 the Court’s recent incorporation of proximate

meeting); Editorial, Age Discrimination, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2009, at A22 (calling for
Congress to reverse Gross as it did Ledbetter).
149. See supra note 27.
150. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
151. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
152. Although the Court stated that the terms “quid pro quo” and “hostile
environment” are of “limited utility,” it acknowledged that they remain relevant in
distinguishing types of conduct. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 743
(1998). In fact, courts still use the terms frequently.
153. Professor Chamallas has described the migration of law regarding sexual
harassment as moving from employment discrimination to tort. See Chamallas, supra
note 31, at 2180–87 (discussing how the law of sexual harassment has influenced
development of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress).
154. See Bernstein, supra note 38, at 451 (discussing the “tort-like wrong of sexual
harassment”).
155. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
156. Id. at 764 (stating that “Title VII borrows from tort law the avoidable
consequences doctrine”).
157. See, e.g., Frank, supra note 10, at 520 (recognizing that included in these tort
principles are the doctrines of “avoidable consequences . . . , respondeat superior
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cause theory to determine subordinate bias liability is the latest
example, and it ushers into employment discrimination law a tort
principle that has been more troublesome in torts than cause-in-fact.
II. MCDONNELL DOUGLAS FRAMEWORK: A PRETEXT FOR RES IPSA
LOQUITUR
Although the tortification of employment discrimination law has
attracted attention and commentary, few have implicated the pretext
analysis developed in McDonnell Douglas. Some courts and
commentators have remarked that pretext analysis is an
incorporation of the tort doctrine of res ipsa loquitur into
antidiscrimination law.158 This Part explores the relationship between
the McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis and res ipsa. It also contends
that the most significant analysis in employment discrimination law
should not be modeled on a tort analysis used for unusual cases in
which the breach in a negligence claim is a mystery. It begins by
examining the tort doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and ends by
recommending that res ipsa, as manifested in the McDonnell Douglas
pretext analysis, should be extirpated from employment
discrimination law.
A. Res Ipsa Loquitur: Latin for “The Thing Speaks for Itself”
The tort “doctrine”159 of res ipsa loquitur seems to be an exotic
mantra imbued with mystical powers. In fact, it is not so mysterious.
It is well explained as a rule regarding the use of circumstantial
evidence in a negligence case. The Restatement (Third) of Torts
describes res ipsa in this way:
[R]es ipsa loquitur is circumstantial evidence of a quite distinctive
form. The doctrine implies that the court does not know, and
cannot find out, what actually happened in the individual case.
Instead, the finding of likely negligence is derived from knowledge
of the causes of the type or category of accidents involved.160

Differently stated, res ipsa permits the fact finder to infer or
presume a breach by the defendant(s) when the plaintiff has
liability, the discovery rule, shifting burdens of proof, the fellow servant rule,
principles of causation, the eggshell skull rule, and others”).
158. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
159. Res ipsa has been variously characterized “as a rule, principle, doctrine,
maxim, and [by] one particularly frustrated scholar, a myth.” G. Gregg Webb, Note,
The Law of Falling Objects: Byrne v. Boadle and the Birth of Res Ipsa Loquitur, 59 STAN. L.
REV. 1065, 1065 (2007).
160. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 17
cmt. a (2010).
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difficulty producing evidence of a specific act or acts by the
defendant(s) that constitute a breach of the standard of care.161
The incantation and invocation of res ipsa is seductive. From many
years of grading the Torts exams of first-year law students, I know that
they are eager to find res ipsa in every exam, if not every fact pattern
on an exam.162 Plaintiffs also seem to be eager to include res ipsa in
their pleadings and requested jury instructions because res ipsa
enables a plaintiff who successfully invokes it to take a case to the fact
finder without proving the precise breach committed by the
defendant.163 Rather, the jury is instructed that it may find some
undefined breach by the defendant based on the circumstantial
evidence.164 Plaintiffs likely also enjoy a second less obvious
advantage: under res ipsa, the cause-in-fact inquiry becomes
muddled, and defendants often have no clear target in arguing
absence of cause-in-fact.165 The but-for causation test inquires
whether the damage would have occurred if the breach had not
occurred. If the breach is presumed but not clearly defined, it is
more difficult to answer the counterfactual inquiry posed by causein-fact analysis. Thus, if the fact finder is willing to infer that an
unknown breach occurred, it may be willing to presume cause-infact as well.
1.

Historical Origins of Res Ipsa Loquitor
For a doctrine shrouded in mystery, there is nothing mysterious
about the source that gave it impetus, although that case was not its
origin.166 The phrase is traced to the pronouncement of Chief Baron

161. See id. § 17 cmt. j (noting that most jurisdictions allow res ipsa to create a
permissive inference of breach).
162. Perhaps it is the allure of Latin. See Clifford A. Hull et al., Understanding Latin
Legalese, available at http://www.dummies.com/how-to/content/understanding-latinlegalese.html (proposing that lawyers’ fondness of Latin phrases stems from the
strong influence that ancient Rome’s legal system had on Western countries).
163. See, e.g., Kerri Lynn Stone, Shortcuts in Employment Discrimination Law, 56 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 111, 146 (2011) (explaining that res ipsa loquitur is “a powerful force
that militates against holding a plaintiff’s lack of access to crucial evidence against
him where the totality of the circumstances indicates that there is not a sound reason
to do so”).
164. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 17 cmt. a (explaining how the jury can reason from general to specific to infer if
there was a breach).
165. See, e.g., Erik S. Knutsen, Ambiguous Cause-in-Fact and Structured Causation: A
Multi-Jurisdictional Approach, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 249, 277–78 (2003) (exploring the
relationship between res ipsa and ambiguous cause-in-fact cases).
166. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D cmt. a (1965) (attributing the
origin to Baron Pollock in Byrne v. Boadle); Webb, supra note 159, at 1067 (“Rarely
has the first use of a well-known legal phrase been so clearly traceable to an

CORBETT.OFF_TO_WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

480

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2/28/2013 1:10 PM

[Vol. 62:447

Jonathan Frederick Pollock in the 1863 British case Byrne v. Boadle.167
The case involved a barrel falling out of a shop on a London street,
hitting a passerby, and permanently injuring him.168 The attorney for
the business argued that the plaintiff had not proven a breach by the
defendant or its employees.169 Chief Baron Pollack launched the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur on its dubious career when he
responded, “There are certain cases of which it may be said res ipsa
loquitur, and this seems one of them.”170 The doctrine would be
more fully developed in two subsequent cases.171 The dissent of Chief
Justice Erle in Scott v. London & St. Katherine Docks Co.172 suggested the
addition of the predicate facts that the injury-causing thing is shown
to be under the control of the defendant or its servants and such
accidents ordinarily do not happen if those in control of the thing
use proper care.173 Next in Briggs v. Oliver,174 the phrase res ipsa
loquitur was combined with the predicate facts from Erle’s dissent.175
One commentator’s chronology of the development of the doctrine
traces it back to an earlier principle in English law of presumptive
negligence when passengers of common carriers were injured and
suffered from a deficit of evidence to establish a breach by the
common carrier.176 The adaptation of this principle of presumptive
negligence in the broader range of cases to which res ipsa was
applied was a positive development for plaintiffs, who were aided by
the doctrine.177
In American tort law, the Restatement (Second) of Torts set forth
the “principle” of res ipsa loquitur, stating that negligence may be
inferred as the cause of a plaintiff’s damage when the following
predicate facts are established: the event is of a kind that ordinarily
does not happen in the absence of negligence; other causes, such as
conduct of the plaintiff and third parties, is sufficiently eliminated;
individual case.”). But see Webb, supra note 159, at 1077 (tracing the term to a 1614
British case).
167. (1863) 159 Eng. Rep. 299, 300 (Exch.).
168. Id. at 299.
169. Id. at 299–300.
170. Id. at 300.
171. See Webb, supra note 159, at 1107–08 (following the evolution of the
doctrine).
172. (1865) 3 H. & C. 596, 601 (Exch.).
173. Id. at 667.
174. (1866) 4 H. & C. 403 (Exch.).
175. See Webb, supra note 159, at 1108 (describing the incorporation of res ipsa
with Erle’s dissent in Briggs as the final step in res ipsa’s beginnings).
176. Id. at 1084–88.
177. Id. at 1107 (stating that “[r]es ipsa loquitur, as it was applied in Byrne and
its progeny, blurred the edges of negligence in favor of injured plaintiffs, not
defendant businesses”).
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and the negligence is within the scope of the defendant’s duty.178
Other courts and authorities have included another element: that
evidence of the cause of the injury is more accessible to the
defendant than the plaintiff.179 While accessibility was not a part of
the Restatement (Second)’s prerequisites, the comment to section
328D recaptured the last element, stating that a plaintiff may
eliminate other responsible causes by showing that the cause of the
event was within the defendant’s responsibility or that the defendant
was responsible for all reasonably probable causes.180
2.

Three problems with res ipsa (that it shares with McDonnell Douglas)
a.

The amorphous prerequisite facts of res ipsa

The establishment of certain prerequisite facts continues to be a
central feature of res ipsa law, which justifies application of the
doctrine and its advantages for plaintiffs. The prerequisite facts also
provide some assurance that the defendant most likely breached the
standard of reasonable care in some undefined or ill-defined way
notwithstanding the plaintiff’s inability to prove the particular
breach.181 The Restatement (Third) explains the reticence about this
doctrine: “[R]es ipsa loquitur does produce an element of
discomfort, inasmuch as the defendant can be found negligent
without any evidence as to the nature or circumstances of the
defendant’s actual conduct.
This discomfort leads to some
circumspection in the application of res ipsa loquitur.”182
Notwithstanding this uneasiness, the Restatement (Third) pares
down the requirements for application of res ipsa to a more basic
requirement: “the accident causing the plaintiff’s harm is a type of
accident that ordinarily happens as a result of the negligence of a
class of actors of which the defendant is the relevant member.”183
The role of the prerequisite facts for invoking res ipsa is to justify
finding a breach and perhaps holding a defendant liable despite the
plaintiff’s inability to prove a specific breach. Yet the role of
178. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D (1965).
179. See William L. Prosser, The Procedural Effect of Res Ipsa Loquitur, 20 MINN. L.
REV. 241, 260 (1936). It has been argued that the accessibility-to-evidence element is
used when courts want to expand res ipsa. Id. (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 9, at 244 (5th ed. 1984)).
180. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D cmt. g.
181. See Okediji, supra note 25, at 84 (acknowledging that prerequisites give
assurance that negligence likely occurred).
182. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 17
cmt. a (2010).
183. Id. § 17.
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prerequisite facts in invoking res ipsa is one of the issues that has
generated the most disagreement among courts and authorities. The
early English case law and the Restatement (Second) articulated the
requirement of three prerequisites.184 The Restatement (Third)
adopted a pared-down test for the applicability of res ipsa.185 The two
other versions that were rejected by the latest Restatement consist of
two steps.186 The first applies res ipsa if the accident is of a type that
usually occurs because of negligence and the instrumentality causing
the harm was under the exclusive control of the defendant.187 The
other two-step formulation requires that the type of accident usually
happens because of negligence, and such negligence is usually that of
the defendant rather than some other party.188
Thus, one of the most unsettled and vexing features of res ipsa
loquitur is the disagreement and uncertainty regarding the predicate
facts which determine whether res ipsa loquitur applies to a given
case. This is a major problem because the predicate facts justify
giving a plaintiff the advantages of res ipsa. If there is confusion,
disagreement, or loss of confidence in these foundational facts, then
res ipsa is likely to be seen as creating an unjustified inference or
presumption that eases the usual burden and requirements imposed
on plaintiffs in typical litigation.189 The disagreement and confusion
over the prerequisites or foundational facts and a resulting loss of
confidence in the presumption raised by the analysis are
characteristics that the McDonnell Douglas pretext framework shares
with res ipsa, as will be developed later.190
b.

Uncertainty regarding the procedural effect of res ipsa

Another troublesome feature of res ipsa that also is suffered by
McDonnell Douglas is, if it is applicable to a claim, its procedural effects
are unclear. Some jurisdictions interpret res ipsa as creating a
permissible inference of breach, while others have held that it has the
more significant procedural effect of creating a rebuttable

184. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D (1965) (listing three
prerequisites).
185. See supra text accompanying note 183. The Restatement (Third) rejected two
other versions, although these versions are accepted by some courts.
186. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 17
cmt. b.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. See supra notes 162–65 and accompanying text.
190. See infra Part II.C.2(a)(i).
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presumption of breach.191 A majority of courts have adopted the view
that res ipsa gives rise to a permissible inference of breach.192 Even in
those jurisdictions, however, the evidence may be such in exceptional
cases that no reasonable fact finder could find that the defendant did
not breach.193 A minority of jurisdictions, by case law or statute,
accord the greater effect of rebuttable presumption.194 Still other
jurisdictions seem to use “permissible inference” and “rebuttable
presumption” interchangeably, not carefully distinguishing the
difference in procedural effect.195 The New York Court of Appeals
acknowledged the tendency of courts to use the terms
interchangeably and explained that courts in that state “have grown
more sensitive to the differences between inferences and
presumptions, recognizing that terminology can carry varying
procedural implications.”196
A third vexing aspect of res ipsa that it shares with McDonnell
Douglas is the uncertainty regarding the types of cases to which it is
applicable. Because res ipsa is considered a rule or principle
regarding circumstantial evidence, some authorities and courts reject
the applicability of res ipsa in cases in which direct evidence of
breach is presented or available.197 This distinction, however, is based
on the much-maligned and ill-defined distinction between
circumstantial and direct evidence.198
191. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 17 cmt. j (distinguishing the jurisdictional split in the effect of res ipsa).
192. Id. § 17 cmt. j.
193. See id. (identifying the minority approach); see also Ryan v. Fast Lane, Inc., 360
S.W.3d 787, 790 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012) (exemplifying the minority approach to res
ipsa).
194. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. 29-6-115(c) (2012); Kendrick v. Pippin, 252 P.3d
1052 (Colo. 2011) (employing the rebuttable presumption standard).
195. See, e.g., Morejon v. Rais Const. Co., 851 N.E.2d 1143, 1146–48 (N.Y. 2006)
(highlighting the various standards of res ipsa used by courts and the tendency to
conflate the standards).
196. Id. at 1147; see also Alan W. Stewart, Note, Are We Allowing the Thing to Speak for
Itself? Linnear v. CenterPoint Energy and Res Ipsa Loquitur in Louisiana, 71 LA. L. REV.
1091, 1099 (2011) (explaining that the uncertainty regarding presumption or
inference was “most likely due to a careless interchanging of the two words by judges”).
197. See Linnear v. CenterPoint Energy Entex/Reliant Energy, 966 So. 2d 36, 41–
42 (La. 2007) (reversing the appellate court after it applied res ipsa despite the fact
that direct evidence was presented); B & K Rentals & Sales Co. v. Universal Leaf
Tobacco Co., 596 A.2d 640, 647 (Md. 1991) (affirming the trial and appellate courts’
decisions not to submit the theory of res ipsa to the jury); Stahlecker v. Ford Motor
Co., 667 N.W.2d 244, 252 (Neb. 2003) (finding the doctrine of res ipsa inapplicable
to the case at hand).
198. This is true both as a principle of evidence generally, and as applied to
employment discrimination law specifically. Regarding the general principle,
consider the following observations:
The problem with the direct-circumstantial distinction is not simply that
common beliefs about the significance of the distinction are false. A more
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The foregoing three problems, uncertainties, or controversies
regarding res ipsa loquitur lead to an overarching characteristic of res
ipsa loquitur that it shares with its sibling McDonnell Douglas—given its
nebulous nature, reticence of courts to ease the usual litigation
burdens of plaintiffs without justification, and the skepticism about
the inference or presumption to be drawn based on surrogate
questions (substitutes for whether the defendant committed a breach
of the standard of care)—the doctrine is more trouble than it is
worth. Consequently, authorities sometimes attempt to limit the
applicability and influence of res ipsa, but it has a dogged tenacity
and perseverance, as indicated by its pervasive acceptance and its
survival in the Restatement (Third). Its unwillingness to succumb,
notwithstanding its many failings, is another thing it shares with
McDonnell Douglas.
Linnear v. Centerpoint Energy Entex/Reliant Energy199 demonstrates
some of the predominant problems with res ipsa. The Louisiana
Supreme Court had defined and refined res ipsa in several decisions
before Linnear.200 The principles announced in Linnear marked a
significant limitation on the use of res ipsa.201 The plaintiffs, wife and
husband, sued for injury of the wife, who fell on her property and
injured her leg.202 They sued a company that recently had replaced a
gas line on their property.203 She sued for negligence in filling the

fundamental problem is that the distinction, while perhaps appealing on the
level of intuition, makes no logical sense. There simply is no category of
evidence that brings us into direct contact with crucial facts because no such
contact is possible. All facts are a function of interpretation, and this
unavoidability of interpretation makes all facts a matter of inference and all
evidence, whether called “direct” or “circumstantial,” nothing more or less
than a contribution to that inferential process.
Richard K. Greenstein, Determining Facts: The Myth of Direct Evidence, 45 HOUS. L.
REV. 1801, 1804 (2009); see also Charles A. Sullivan, Plausibly Pleading Employment
Discrimination, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1613, 1658 n.220 (2011) [hereinafter
Sullivan, Plausibly Pleading] (citing 1A JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT
COMMON LAW § 24, at 945 n.5 (Peter Tillers ed., 1983) (concluding there is no
clear distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence)). Regarding the
distinction in the employment discrimination context, the Court in Desert Palace,
Inc. v. Costa made the unimportance of distinguishing between direct and
circumstantial evidence a linchpin of its decision. 539 U.S. 90, 99–100 (2003).
199. 966 So. 2d 36 (La. 2007).
200. Stewart, supra note 196, at 1095 (stating that since its recognition in a case in
1899, “Louisiana courts have continuously developed the doctrine, but . . . they
experienced significant confusion about the requirements for the doctrine’s
applicability and its effects”).
201. See Linnear, 966 So. 2d at 43 (noting the lower court’s misapplication of
res ipsa).
202. Id. at 38.
203. Id.
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trench and sodding the area after replacing the gas line.204 The
company produced the testimony of two employees who worked on
the project, who described in detail how the filling and re-sodding
was done.205 The plaintiffs introduced the testimony of the wife
regarding the fall and photographs of the area where the woman
fell.206 The trial court rejected the plaintiff’s request for a res ipsa
jury instruction, and the jury returned a verdict for the defendant.207
The appellate court reversed, holding that the trial court committed
reversible error by not giving a res ipsa instruction and, conducting a
de novo review, held that the defendant was negligent.208
The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed, explaining that it had
long held that res ipsa should be applied sparingly209 and imposing
two significant limitations on the applicability of the doctrine.210
First, the court held that it “only applies where direct evidence of
defendant’s negligence is not available to assist the plaintiff to
present a prima facie case of negligence.”211 The court explained
that in the case before it direct evidence was not only available, but
presented and considered.212 Second, the court stated the three
predicate criteria213 and held that a judge may give a res ipsa
instruction only if the judge concludes that reasonable minds could
differ on all three of those facts.214 Considering these two holdings,
a commentator concluded that the Louisiana court had narrowed
the applicability of res ipsa.215 Moreover, given that all a plaintiff
obtains procedurally from a res ipsa instruction in Louisiana is a
permissible inference of breach, that commentator concluded that
plaintiffs would be better off without res ipsa, as obvious breaches
would speak for themselves without Latin.216
204. Id. at 38–39.
205. Id. at 39.
206. Id. at 39–40.
207. Id. at 40.
208. Id. at 40–41.
209. Id. at 44.
210. See infra notes 211–14 and accompanying text (describing the limited
situations in which res ipsa is appropriate).
211. Linnear, 966 So. 2d at 42.
212. Id. One troubling aspect of this holding is that it does not specify which party
or parties must have access to direct evidence. The court characterized the evidence
as “competing direct evidence,” id., but that does not seem correct. Only the
defendant had evidence that might be described as direct.
213. Although the Louisiana courts have varied in their statements, the court in
Linnear listed them as follows: (1) injury is of type that ordinarily does not occur
without negligence; (2) evidence sufficiently eliminates other more probable causes;
and (3) alleged negligence is within scope of defendant’s duty to plaintiff. Id. at 44.
214. Id.
215. Stewart, supra note 196, at 1106–09.
216. Id. at 1110.
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B. McDonnell Douglas Pretext Analysis: Preventing Discrimination from
Speaking for Itself
The McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis is a barely modified version
of res ipsa loquitur, and it suffers from some of the same problems.
The three-stage framework with shifting burdens of production is
well-worn and well-known.217 The first stage of the framework is for
the plaintiff to satisfy the burden of production on four predicate
criteria: (1) plaintiff is protected by the applicable employment
discrimination statute; (2) she applied for a job for which she was
qualified; (3) she was not hired; and (4) the position remained open
and the employer continued to seek applicants with qualifications
like those of plaintiff.218 The Supreme Court also explained in the
McDonnell Douglas opinion itself,219 and then later in McDonald v.
Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co.,220 that the elements of the prima
facie case may vary depending upon the facts; that qualification will
be addressed more fully later.221 If the plaintiff satisfies the burden of
production on the prima facie case, and plaintiffs usually do because
so little is required,222 the plaintiff enjoys a rebuttable presumption of
discrimination, and the burden of production shifts to the defendant
employer to produce sufficient evidence of a “legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason” for the adverse employment action.223 If
the employer satisfies its burden of production at stage two, and
employers almost always do,224 the burden or production shifts back
217. In McDonnell Douglas, an African American former employee sued his
employer for discriminatory employment practices when the employer laid him off
and would not subsequently re-hire him because of his participation in the Civil
Rights Movement. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 794 (1973). To
evaluate the complainant’s claim, the Supreme Court articulated a test that first gives
the plaintiff the burden of showing a prima facie case of racial discrimination, and
then shifts the burden to the employer to provide “some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason” for rejecting the employee. Id. at 802. Once this is done,
the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of persuasion in proving the employer’s
alleged reason for the adverse employment decision is pretextual and its actual
reason is discriminatory. Id. at 804.
218. Id. at 802.
219. Id. at 802 n.13.
220. 427 U.S. 273, 279 n.6 (1976).
221. For further discussion, see infra notes 235–40 and accompanying text.
222. Plaintiffs easily satisfy the burden of production. See, e.g., Charles A. Sullivan,
Disparate Impact: Looking Past the Desert Palace Mirage, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 911,
927 (2005) [hereinafter Sullivan, Disparate Impact] (observing that “the first step of
McDonnell Douglas, the prima facie case, has always required little proof”).
223. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981).
224. Defendants rarely have trouble satisfying the burden at this stage, either.
Denny Chin & Jodi Golinsky, Moving Beyond McDonnell Douglas: A Simplified Method
for Assessing Evidence in Discrimination Cases, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 659, 665 (1998); see also
Sullivan, Disparate Impact, supra note 222, at 928 (“The requirements the defendant
must meet are thus minimal: first, the nondiscriminatory reason must be put into

CORBETT.OFF_TO_WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

2/28/2013 1:10 PM

UNMASKING A PRETEXT FOR RES IPSA LOQUITOR

487

to the plaintiff to prove that the defendant’s reason is pretextual.225
The burden of persuasion on the ultimate issue of discrimination
remains with the plaintiff.226 If the plaintiff proves pretext, then the
fact finder may find, but is not required to find, that the employer
discriminated.227
Although some have recognized the pretext analysis as a barely
modified version of res ipsa loquitur and the McDonnell Douglas
framework have a lot in common, the Supreme Court has never
identified it as such. So let us unveil McDonnell Douglas as a mere
pretext for res ipsa. First, both are treatments, rules, or doctrines
regarding use of circumstantial evidence, ascribing procedural
consequences to the production of circumstantial evidence regarding
certain issues. As noted above, res ipsa loquitur often has been called
a rule or doctrine regarding circumstantial evidence.228
The
Supreme Court made clear early on that the McDonnell Douglas
pretext framework was designed to analyze cases involving
circumstantial evidence of employment discrimination.229
A second similarity is the significance and function of the predicate
facts. In order for res ipsa to apply to a case, certain prerequisites or
predicate facts must be established.230 This is true, too, of the pretext
analysis. In Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters,231 the Supreme Court
explained the reason that the predicate facts in the analysis justified a
presumption of discrimination:
A prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas raises an inference of
discrimination only because we presume these acts, if otherwise
unexplained, are more likely than not based on the consideration
of impermissible factors. And we are willing to presume this largely
because we know from our experience that more often than not

evidence and not just argued and second, the nondiscriminatory reason must not be
too vague, as some courts have rejected nondiscriminatory reasons for vagueness.”).
225. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.
226. See, e.g., St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 518 (1993) (citing
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256).
227. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000); Hicks, 509
U.S. at 509–10.
228. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 17 cmt. a (2010).
229. The Court explained the rationale for according the circumstantial evidence
procedural significance in Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577
(1978). In dissenting opinions, the Court has recognized that the pretext analysis
manipulates circumstantial evidence. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 584
(2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Hicks, 509 U.S. at 536 (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting).
230. See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the role of the predicate facts).
231. 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
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people do not act in a totally arbitrary manner, without any
underlying reasons, especially in a business setting. Thus, when all
legitimate reasons for rejecting an applicant have been eliminated
as possible reasons for the employer’s actions, it is more likely than
not the employer, who we generally assume acts only with some
reason, based his decision on an impermissible consideration such
as race.232

Despite the similarities between res ipsa and the McDonnell Douglas
analysis regarding predicate facts, there is one respect in which the
analyses differ. In the tort doctrine, the plaintiff bears the burden of
establishing all of the prerequisites for the applicability of res ipsa,
whereas in the pretext analysis, the burden of production shifts
between the plaintiff and the defendant. The divided burden in the
pretext analysis means that the defendant must first provide a reason
for the adverse employment action before the plaintiff can attack that
reason as pretextual.233
A third similarity between res ipsa and pretext is the variability of
the predicates that must be established for application.234 The
Supreme Court explained that the elements of the McDonnell Douglas
prima facie case vary depending on the facts.235 In most cases, the
variation in elements occurs because the adverse employment action
differs from the refusal to rehire at issue in McDonnell Douglas.236 As
Professor Sullivan has observed, “the famous four prongs of the
prima facie case were tailored to the relatively unusual facts before
the Court, namely an employer’s refusal to rehire a qualified black
former employee when the job in question remained vacant.”237 For
example, the elements are varied where the complained-of adverse
employment action is a reduction in force.238 Moreover, some courts
vary the basic McDonnell Douglas prima facie case when the claim is
one of so-called “reverse discrimination,” in which the plaintiff is not
a member of a class that historically has not suffered much

232. Id. at 577 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
233. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973) (requiring
the lower court to give the respondent an opportunity to show that petitioner’s
stated reason for the adverse employment action was pretextual).
234. The different elements that have been required for res ipsa are detailed above.
See supra Part II.A.2 (laying out the requirements for a plaintiff’s res ipsa claim).
235. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 n.13.
236. See id. at 796 (alleging that, after the employee was laid-off, the employer
failed to re-hire plaintiff for race reasons).
237. Sullivan, Disparate Impact, supra note 222, at 926.
238. See Developments in the Law—Shifting Burdens of Proof in Employment
Discrimination Litigation, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1579, 1587–88 (1996) (discussing variation
on the prima facie case when the plaintiff cannot be immediately compared to
another employee).
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discrimination, such as Caucasians or men.239 Some courts have
varied the prima facie case in reverse discrimination cases, imposing
an additional requirement on a plaintiff to produce evidence of
“background circumstances” suggesting that the employer is an
unusual employer that would be likely to discriminate against a
member of a class that historically has not suffered substantial
employment discrimination.240
A fourth similarity, and one that is particularly important to this
topic, is the procedural effect accorded the circumstantial evidence
under res ipsa and McDonnell Douglas.241 As discussed above, some
jurisdictions at various times have accorded res ipsa the effect of a
rebuttable presumption that a breach occurred, but most give it the
effect of a permissible inference.242 The procedural effect of a
plaintiff satisfying her burdens of production in the pretext analysis
has been the subject of several Supreme Court decisions, culminating
with Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.243 It is now well
established that if a plaintiff satisfies the burdens of production on
the prima facie case and pretext, the fact finder may, but is not
required, to infer that the defendant employer illegally
discriminated.244
A final similarity between res ipsa and the pretext analysis is the
uncertainty regarding the type of cases to which they apply. For res
ipsa, a couple of questions arise: (1) Does it apply to cases in which a
plaintiff attempts to prove a specific breach, but also pleads res ipsa
239. See Charles A. Sullivan, Circling Back to the Obvious: The Convergence of
Traditional and Reverse Discrimination in Title VII Proof, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1031,
1035–36 (2004) [hereinafter Sullivan, Circling] (explaining the differences between
“traditional” discrimination and reverse discrimination).
240. See, e.g., Duffy v. Wolle, 123 F.3d 1026, 1036 (8th Cir. 1997), abrogated by
Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031 (8th Cir. 2011); Parker v. Balt. & Ohio
R.R. Co., 652 F.2d 1012, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1981). See generally Sullivan, Circling, supra
note 239, at 1065–71 (discussing courts’ opinions and logic surrounding background
circumstances and noting that the term “background circumstances” is
“amorphous”); Timothy K. Giordano, Comment, Different Treatment for Non-Minority
Plaintiffs Under Title VII: A Call for Modification of the Background Circumstances Test To
Ensure That Separate Is Equal, 49 EMORY L.J. 993, 1001–11 (2000); Donald T. Kramer,
Annotation, What Constitutes Reverse or Majority Race or National Origin Discrimination
Violative of Federal Constitution or Statutes—Private Employment Cases, 150 A.L.R. FED. 1,
27 (1998).
241. See Okediji, supra note 25, at 85 (stating that “[t]he procedural effect of res
ipsa loquitur has been as troublesome in the practice of tort law as the Title VII
McDonnell Douglas-Burdine framework has been in the practice of employment
discrimination law”).
242. Supra notes 192–96 and accompanying text.
243. 530 U.S. 133 (2000).
244. Id. at 147–48 (holding that if a plaintiff bears her burden, there is a
permissible inference at summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law stages);
St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993).
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and seeks a res ipsa jury instruction in the alternative?; (2) Does it
apply to cases in which direct evidence is introduced, and if it is not
applicable in such cases, does such inapplicability depend on which
party introduced the direct evidence? A very difficult and pivotal
issue imbedded in those questions is how a court should distinguish
between direct and circumstantial evidence. As for the pretext
analysis, Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Price Waterhouse
was the origin of the dividing line that the McDonnell Douglas analysis
applied to cases involving circumstantial evidence but not to cases
involving direct evidence, to which the mixed-motives analysis,
originally developed in Price Waterhouse, applied.245 However, after
Congress modified and codified the mixed-motives analysis in the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, the Supreme Court decided in Desert Palace,
Inc. v. Costa,246 based on the language of the statutory change, that
the mixed-motives analysis is not restricted to cases in which direct
evidence of discrimination is produced.247 Now, there is great
uncertainty and confusion about the types of cases to which the
McDonnell Douglas analysis applies.248
In sum, the similarities between res ipsa loquitur and the McDonnell
Douglas pretext analysis and the problems they share are striking.
The most significant difference between the McDonnell Douglas proof
structure and res ipsa is the shifting burdens of production under
McDonnell Douglas, along with the fact that the plaintiff does enjoy a
rebuttable presumption of discrimination after establishing a prima
facie case. This is an insignificant distinction, however, because
almost every defendant employer rebuts that presumption by
producing evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.249
245. See supra Part I.D.
246. 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
247. Id. at 101–02.
248. See Henry L. Chambers, Jr., The Effect of Eliminating Distinctions Among Title VII
Disparate Treatment Cases, 57 SMU L. REV. 83, 102–03 (2004) (concluding that lower
courts need guidance from the Supreme Court on how to decide disparate treatment
cases); Kenneth R. Davis, Price-Fixing: Refining the Price Waterhouse Standard and
Individual Disparate Treatment Law, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 859, 861 (2004) (noting that
not only is there disagreement about what constitutes direct evidence, but also that
when the Court attempted to resolve this issue in Desert Palace, it failed to even
mention McDonnell Douglas, creating additional confusion); Kaitlin Picco, The MixedMotive Mess: Defining and Applying a Mixed-Motive Framework, 26 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L.
461, 464–65 (2011); Sullivan, Plausibly Pleading, supra note 198, at 1650–51
(describing the inconsistent ways that McDonnell Douglas is applied, if at all).
249. Miles v. M.N.C. Corp., 750 F.2d 867, 870 (11th Cir. 1985); George
Rutherglen, Abolition in a Different Voice, 78 VA. L. REV. 1463, 1474 (1992) (book
review) (“The fact that the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case in McDonnell
Douglas usually is of no consequence because the plaintiff’s burden of making out
that case, and the defendant’s rebuttal burden of showing a ‘legitimate
nondiscriminatory’ reason, are so easily satisfied. Almost all individual cases under
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Moreover, the shifting burden is merely a burden of production,
unlike the mixed-motives analysis in which the burden of persuasion
shifts.250 Although res ipsa does not impose shifting burdens of
production, in reality defendants do produce evidence to attempt to
rebut both the prerequisites for application of res ipsa and the
ultimate issue of a breach by the defendant. Ultimately, then, both
res ipsa and McDonnell Douglas give plaintiffs the advantage of a
permissive inference—permitting, but not compelling, the fact finder
to infer breach or employment discrimination, respectively. In
summary, McDonnell Douglas looks like res ipsa, performs like it, and
shares its problems.
If the McDonnell Douglas analysis is essentially res ipsa loquitur, why
did the Supreme Court not identify it as such? As discussed earlier,
the Court has clearly declared in several employment discrimination
cases, including Staub most recently, that it was borrowing from tort
law. A few possible answers occur. First, perhaps the Court did not
realize that it was importing res ipsa into employment discrimination
law. Second, maybe the Court realized that it was importing res ipsa,
but it did not think it important to say that it was doing so. Third,
McDonnell Douglas was one of the earliest Title VII cases decided by
the Supreme Court, and the notion that Title VII was merely a
statutory tort or that tort law could be adopted to do the work of a
civil rights and public policy statute might have been surprising or
controversial in 1973. Regardless of why the Court did not identify
the pretext analysis as largely unexpurgated tort law, the exposure of
it as such prompts three questions: (1) What other options did the
court have?; (2) Was it appropriate to import res ipsa as the most
fundamental analysis in employment discrimination law?; and (3)
Regardless of the propriety at the time of adoption, is it appropriate
to retain it today? The questions and answers are related and are
treated together in the next Section.

McDonnell Douglas come down to a determination whether the plaintiff has proved
that the ‘legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason’ offered by the defendant is really a
pretext for discrimination.”).
250. See supra Part I.D (discussing the evolution of the mixed-motives analysis and
the requirements that fall upon each party).
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C. The Appropriateness of Res Ipsa Loquitur for Employment Discrimination
Law
1.

In the beginning—forty years ago the Court adopted the pretext
framework
Whether the Supreme Court should have adopted, and only
slightly modified, res ipsa loquitur as the basic analysis for the most
common type of employment discrimination claim—individual
disparate treatment—depends in part on the existing alternatives.
Much of the McDonnell Douglas opinion is hard to understand if one
does not see it as the Court’s effort to explain why the innovative
employment discrimination law theory it approved in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co.—disparate impact—did not apply to the type of claim
presented in McDonnell Douglas.251 The Court explained that the
court of appeals had committed error in rejecting the employer’s
given reason for not rehiring the employee-plaintiff.252 The Court
further explained that the lower court had relied on Griggs for the
position that exclusionary employment practices that cannot be
justified by their relation to job performance violate Title VII.253 The
Court then declared that Green appeared “in different clothing,” and
the expansive principles embodied in the disparate impact theory of
Griggs did not apply to his claim.254 Instead, if Green could not
disprove as pretextual the employer’s reason for not rehiring him—
that he engaged in an unlawful stall-in—he would lose.255 This
approach was necessary, the Court explained, to accommodate the
“societal as well as personal interests on both sides of this
equation . . . [,] [t]he broad, overriding interest, shared by employer,
employee, and consumer” in “efficient and trustworthy workmanship
assured through fair and racially neutral employment and personnel
decisions.”256
Thus, without invoking the term, the Court adopted a barely
modified version of res ipsa loquitur. The Court later would make
the res ipsa roots clear when, in Furnco, it explained the justification
for the pretext analysis: if the most common reasons for an adverse
employment action are eliminated through the three stages of the
251. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 805–06 (1973).
252. Id. at 805–06 (pointing out that even though the employee’s behavior was not
directly related to his qualifications for the job, it could still constitute a “legitimate,
nondiscriminatory” reason for the employer to refrain from re-hiring him).
253. Id.
254. Id. at 806.
255. Id. at 805.
256. Id. at 801.
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pretext analysis, then discrimination more likely than not is the
reason for the action.257 So, the Court adopted res ipsa in McDonnell
Douglas rather than creating new law as it had in Griggs. According to
the Court’s rationale in McDonnell Douglas, this res ipsa analysis
accommodated the competing and shared interests of employers,
employees, and consumers.258 Furthermore, as the Court explained
more fully in Furnco, the rationale supporting res ipsa in tort law also
fit the context of intentional discrimination analysis: if certain
predicate facts could be established, then discrimination was a moreprobable-than-not explanation of the adverse employment action at
issue, just as breach is a likely cause of the damages in a negligence
case if the res ipsa foundational facts can be established.259 Moreover,
as Justice O’Connor would explain in her concurring opinion in Price
Waterhouse sixteen years after the McDonnell Douglas framework was
unveiled: “[T]he entire purpose of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie
case is to compensate for the fact that direct evidence of intentional
discrimination is hard to come by.”260 Thus, as with res ipsa, the
pretext framework was a tool bestowed on plaintiffs to help them
marshal circumstantial evidence to present a case of intentional
discrimination.261
Should the Court in McDonnell Douglas have adopted res ipsa as the
analysis for individual disparate treatment claims? It is difficult to
determine now whether the Court in 1973 made a good decision, but
the balancing of interests and rejection of Griggs articulated in
McDonnell Douglas, and the post-hoc explanation of the analysis under
the res ipsa rationale by the Court in Furnco and Justice O’Connor’s
concurring opinion in Price Waterhouse are well reasoned and
persuasive. If the Court believed that employment discrimination was
common enough that judges were willing to infer discrimination
from a flimsy prima facie case and a showing of pretext, then res ipsa
should have functioned well enough in helping plaintiffs present
cases based on circumstantial evidence.262 Over time, however, the

257. 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
258. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 801.
259. See Furnco, 438 U.S. at 577 (asserting that people do not act arbitrarily in
these business situations).
260. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 271 (1989) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
261. See id. (finding that this framework would not be appropriate when direct
evidence is available).
262. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147 (2000)
(noting that a plaintiff’s presentation of circumstantial evidence can be “quite
persuasive”).
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shortcomings of using res ipsa as the basic analysis increasingly began
to show, and the utter failure now should be apparent.
2. Forty years of using res ipsa/McDonnell Douglas pretext demonstrates
the need for change
Even if the Court’s 1973 adoption of res ipsa in employment
discrimination law was a good, or at least reasonable, decision at the
time, the experience with it over forty years yields a dramatically
different assessment of the decision to cling to it now. The chinks in
the armor have been many, and cumulatively they render
indefensible the maintenance of res ipsa in employment
discrimination law. This section addresses two specific developments
and one overarching theme that render maintenance of the “res ipsa
McDonnell Douglas” regime untenable now.
a. Two specific developments in the use of the McDonnell Douglas
analysis
i.

Enervation of the prima facie case and pretext

From 1973–2003, the Supreme Court worked with the McDonnell
Douglas framework, trying to explain its substantive and procedural
meaning, striving to bolster its weak prima facie case, and attempting
to retain sufficient flexibility in both the first (prima facie case) and
third (pretext) stages in order to make the analysis workable in
various factual scenarios. The lower courts in turn have worked with
what the Supreme Court has given them, and the result has been
confusing; but for a high tolerance of the courts to work through
uncertainties and vagaries,263 the result could be close to chaotic.264
The Court early on began working with the analysis, explaining that
variations in the prima facie case would be necessary and explaining
the substantive meaning and procedural effects of the second and
third stages of the analysis. The fact that the Supreme Court and the
lower courts have spent so much time tinkering with the proof
263. See, e.g., Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 175–76 (2009) (holding
that the mixed-motives analysis does not apply to age discrimination claims under
the ADEA and the “because of” statutory language in the ADEA means but-for
causation); Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 92 (2003) (holding that direct
evidence is not required to invoke the “motivating factor” statutory standard inserted
in Title VII by the Civil Rights Act of 1991).
264. In its decision in Desert Palace, the Ninth Circuit used the terms “a quagmire,”
a “morass,” and “chaos” to describe the state of the law on disparate treatment proof
structures. Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 851–53 (9th Cir. 2002), aff’d,
539 U.S. 90 (2003). The Ninth Circuit’s assessment predated the Supreme Court’s
decisions in Desert Palace and Gross, which have exacerbated the chaos.
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structure rather than addressing questions about discrimination—
which are sufficiently numerous, complex, and important in their
own right—is indicative of the failure of this res ipsa analysis.265
Ultimately, neither the efforts to adjust and fortify the prima face case
nor the explication of the pretext stage have proven efficacious in
maintaining a generally applicable, useful, comprehensible,
palatable, and flexible analysis.
First, the Court began working to explain and repair problems in
the prima facie case soon after it was announced. The Court in
McDonnell Douglas itself reserved the possibility that the elements of
the prima facie case might change depending on the factual
situation.266 The Court reiterated that idea in the course of holding
that the framework applied to a reverse discrimination case in Santa
Fe Trail.267 As courts applied the pretext analysis to subsequent
reverse discrimination cases, however, the ill fit between res ipsa
analysis and reverse discrimination cases would become obvious.268
After Santa Fe Trail, the Court continued to struggle with problems
raised by the prima facie case. In Texas Department of Community
Affairs v. Burdine,269 the Court was confronted with the issue of the
ease with which virtually any minimally qualified plaintiff could satisfy
the prima facie case and thus achieve a rebuttable presumption of
discrimination.270
The Court responded by “slipping in” an
additional statement about the prima facie case, which Professor
Malamud labeled a “stealth requirement,” inserted to assuage
concerns of some justices that the prima facie case was not sufficiently
demanding.271 The Court’s final opinion noted that the plaintiff’s
265. See, e.g., Sperino, Rethinking, supra note 4, at 81 (“[T]he use of the
frameworks often creates questions that might not otherwise arise—because the
questions are about the frameworks themselves, rather than about the substantive
discrimination inquiry.”); id. at 105 (“After a framework is created, courts often
funnel their discrimination inquiries through this typology, rather than through the
statutory language. Like the prisoners in the allegory of the cave, courts (and
litigants) begin to review discrimination based on a shadow of reality.”).
266. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 n.13 (1973) (“The
facts necessarily will vary in Title VII cases, and the specification above of the prima
facie proof required from respondent is not necessarily applicable in every respect to
differing factual situations.”).
267. See 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
268. See supra notes 239–40; infra notes 313–28 and accompanying text
(discussing the challenges of applying the pretext analysis to the fact patterns that
deviate from traditional discrimination cases and providing examples of those
situations).
269. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
270. Id. at 253.
271. See Malamud, supra note 23, at 2246–54 (shedding light on the Court’s
decision-making considerations and noting various justices’ concerns with plaintiffs’
light burden in the McDonnel Douglas framework).
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burden is not “onerous,” and added the “stealth requirement” that
the prima facie case requires the plaintiff to prove “by a
preponderance of the evidence that she applied for an available
position for which she was qualified, but was rejected under the
circumstances which give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.”272
Although the stealth requirement has not often been repeated or
seemed to make a difference in many cases since Burdine,273 it
demonstrates that the Court recognized the weakness of the
McDonnell Douglas prima facie case fewer than ten years after it
announced the proof structure, and it wavered from the res ipsabased rationale it articulated in Furnco. Like res ipsa, the McDonnell
Douglas framework shares an uncertain and changing prima facie
case.274
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue again
since its 1976 decision in Santa Fe Trail, the inadequacy of the prima
facie case has been particularly evident and vexatious in reverse
discrimination cases in the lower courts.275 The McDonnell Douglas
analysis does not function reasonably in such cases without an
adjustment, and that adjustment is one which flouts the equal
treatment foundation of employment discrimination law. It should
not be surprising that the unadjusted prima facie case does not
function well in reverse discrimination cases in view of the Court’s
explanation in Furnco. In Furnco, the Court articulated its res ipsa
rationale for the permissive inference arising from a plaintiff’s
successful navigation of McDonnell Douglas. The rationale is based in
the idea that employment discrimination is fairly common and the
prima facie case eliminates the two most common nondiscriminatory
reasons for adverse employment actions. Thus, if an adverse
employment action remains unexplained by the employer (because
the plaintiff has proven the employer’s proffered reason to be
pretextual), then discrimination is more likely than not the
explanation.
In reverse discrimination cases, the foregoing
formulation does not work because reverse discrimination has not
been commonly practiced historically.276 Accordingly, some courts

272. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253 (emphasis added).
273. See, e.g., St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993) (failing to
mention the language of the stealth requirement).
274. See supra Part II.A.2.
275. See infra notes 313–28 and accompanying text (describing the challenging
fact patterns in Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 2011), and
in Burlington v. News Corp., 759 F. Supp. 2d 580 (E.D. Pa. 2010)).
276. See Sperino, Rethinking, supra note 4, at 78–79 (noting that “some courts
began doubting that the inferences created by McDonnell Douglas made sense in

CORBETT.OFF_TO_WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

2/28/2013 1:10 PM

UNMASKING A PRETEXT FOR RES IPSA LOQUITOR

497

have required that a plaintiff in a reverse discrimination case prove
something additional to establish a prima facie case—background
circumstances showing that the employer at issue is one which would
be likely to engage in this historically uncommon type of
discrimination.277 However, other courts object to imposing the
additional requirement in the prima facie case,278 with some of those
courts reasoning that to do so would violate an important theoretical
foundation of employment discrimination law—equal treatment of
similarly situated persons.279
Thus, the prima facie case stage of McDonnell Douglas has proven to
be too weak of a basis to support a rebuttable presumption of
discrimination and to be inadequately flexible to address various
types of cases. Similarly, the predicate facts of res ipsa loquitur, on
which the inference of breach is founded, have been undermined,
challenged, and revised.
In addition to the facts constituting the prima facie case, the other
predicate fact upon which Furnco based the inference of
discrimination was the plaintiff’s production of sufficient evidence
that the employer’s proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
was pretextual. Over the years, the Court has wavered in its
conviction about the inference to be drawn from that predicate fact,
as the debate spanned decades and two Supreme Court decisions.280
As with the prima facie case, the Supreme Court has spent its
resources, as well as those of the lower courts and litigants,
reverse discrimination cases, where the plaintiff was not a member of a historically
discriminated against group”).
277. See, e.g., Duffy v. Wolle, 123 F.3d 1026, 1036 (8th Cir. 1997) (noting that
being a minority is enough to suggest discrimination, but being a historically nondiscriminated-against person requires more); Parker v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 652
F.2d 1012, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (finding that it makes no sense in contemporary
society to infer majority discrimination in the same manner as minority
discrimination).
278. See, e.g., Iadimarco v. Runyon, 190 F.3d 151, 161 (3d Cir. 1999) (rejecting the
background circumstances factor because all that is required is a showing that “the
employer is treating some people less favorably than others based upon a trait that is
protected under Title VII”); Lind v. City of Battle Creek, 681 N.W.2d 334, 335 (Mich.
2004) (overruling a prior decision that used the background circumstances
requirement because it clearly conflicted with the state’s civil rights laws).
279. See, e.g., Clements v. Barden Miss. Gaming, L.L.C., 373 F. Supp. 2d 653,
667–68 (N.D. Miss. 2004) (calling the background circumstances requirement
“illogical and even dangerous”); Lind, 681 N.W.2d at 335 (stating that “‘individual’
means ‘individual’”).
280. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148 (2000)
(holding that, on a motion for judgment as a matter of law, a plaintiff is not required
to go beyond proof of the prima facie case and pretext in order for the fact finder to
infer discrimination); St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993)
(holding that, for a final judgment, a fact finder may—but is not required to—infer
discrimination from evidence showing the employer’s given reasons are false).
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interpreting the meaning of the “res ipsa McDonnell Douglas”
framework, rather than addressing questions about the ultimate issue
of employment discrimination.281
Termed pretext-plus versus
pretext-only,282 the primary issue in the debate was determining the
procedural effect of a plaintiff’s introducing sufficient evidence of
pretext at stage three.
The Court addressed the effect of proving pretext vis-à-vis two
burdens that the plaintiff bears: persuasion and production. First,
the Court addressed the burden of persuasion in 1993 in St. Mary’s
Honor Center v. Hicks,283 wherein the Court held that proving pretext
permits, but does not require, the fact finder to infer
discrimination.284
While many civil rights advocates and
commentators were chagrined by the holding in Hicks, it was
consistent with the procedural effect generally accorded to res ipsa in
tort law, although some courts and jurisdictions accord res ipsa a
stronger effect.285 Realistically, not much more could be expected
from an analysis in which the Court already had shown a significant
lack of confidence.
The Court considered the procedural effect of pretext in the
context of the burden of production in 2000 in Reeves.286 The Court
considered whether sufficient evidence of pretext would enable a
plaintiff to survive a challenge to sufficiency of the evidence
(summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law).287 The Court
held that proving pretext may permit the trier of fact to conclude
that the employer discriminated, although the Court would not state

281. See supra note 265 and accompanying text (explaining that pretext analysis
forces courts to scrutinize litigants’ abilities to satisfy the elements of an ill-fitted
framework, rather than encourage courts to apply antidiscrimination statutes to the
particular facts of a case).
282. See Catherine J. Lanctot, The Defendant Lies and the Plaintiff Loses: The Fallacy of
the “Pretext-Plus” Rule in Employment Discrimination Cases, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 57, 65–66
(1991) (defining the pretext-only rule as requiring only evidence that the defendant
lied about its discriminatory motivations, while defining the pretext-plus rule as
requiring pretext and an actual showing of discriminatory intent).
283. 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
284. Id. at 511 (establishing the procedural effect of proving pretext as giving rise
to a permissive inference of discrimination, rather than a rebuttable presumption).
285. See supra Part II.A.3 (explaining that the majority of jurisdictions interpret the
procedural effect of res ipsa loquitur as creating a permissible inference of breach,
but some courts view it as creating a rebuttable presumption). Many civil rights
advocates and commentators were chagrined by the holding in Hicks. See, e.g.,
Deborah A. Calloway, St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks: Questioning the Basic
Assumption, 26 CONN. L. REV. 997, 998, 1037–38 (1994) (chronicling the continued
prevalence of discrimination in American society and criticizing the Supreme Court
for placing an unfair burden on plaintiffs in Hicks).
286. 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000).
287. Id. at 147–48.
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that proof of pretext always will support such a conclusion.288 So,
once again in Reeves, the Court held that a plaintiff’s successful
navigation of the pretext analysis yields a permissive inference of
discrimination at yet another procedural juncture.289 However, the
Court in Reeves suggested that the permissive inference is stronger at
summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law than it is in Hicks
at verdict or judgment.290 Justice Ginsburg found this suggestion
somewhat unsatisfactory.291 In her concurring opinion in Reeves, she
ruminated that the Court in the future might need to more precisely
define circumstances that would require a plaintiff to submit
evidence beyond a prima facie case and pretext.292
Such
circumstances, she anticipated, would be uncommon.293
Thus, the Supreme Court and lower courts have struggled with the
procedural effect and substantive meaning of two stages of the threepart McDonnell Douglas analysis. As previously discussed above, these
struggles are analogous to the uncertainties and discomforts courts
have experienced with the prerequisite or predicate facts in res
ipsa.294 Ultimately what these struggles have demonstrated is that res
ipsa was ill-suited to employment discrimination law, and the fit has
become progressively worse since 1973. The Court and courts have
spent substantial time and resources attempting to mitigate the
problems with the framework, but they have failed.
ii. Creation of an alternative framework
The second development that has undermined whatever utility “res
ipsa McDonnell Douglas” might have had is the Court’s recognition
that the pretext/res ipsa analysis would be inadequate to evaluate all
types of individual disparate treatment claims. Consequently, the
Court created the alternative mixed-motives analysis, which was, and
is now, much better-suited than pretext/res ipsa to evaluating
intentional discrimination.
Soon after the Court created the
mixed—motives analysis, Congress would codify a modified version of
it. By creating the second framework and later eradicating the
dividing line between the cases governed by each framework, the
Supreme Court led employment discrimination jurisprudence into
virtual chaos.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.

Id. at 148.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 154–55 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
See supra Parts II.A–B.
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In Price Waterhouse, the Court acknowledged that “res ipsa
McDonnell Douglas” was inadequate to address all types of individual
disparate treatment cases.295 In that case, the Court created what has
come to be known as the mixed-motives analysis to analyze cases in
which more than one motive causes the employer to take an adverse
employment action.296 Congress would later modify and codify the
mixed-motives analysis in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, thus
embedding the “motivating factor”297 and same-decision defense298
stages of the analysis in Title VII, although the effect of same-decision
was changed to a limitation on remedies rather than a defense to
liability. Faced with the question of which analysis to apply in any
given case, the lower courts crafted a dividing line based on Justice
O’Connor’s Price Waterhouse concurrence, whereby McDonnell Douglas
applied to claims proven by circumstantial evidence and mixed
motives applied to claims supported by direct evidence.299
In 2003, the Supreme Court erased the line between McDonnell
Douglas cases and mixed-motives cases in Desert Palace, holding that
direct evidence is not necessary to obtain a “motivating factor” jury
instruction under Title VII as amended by the Civil Rights Act of
1991.300 Since the decision in Desert Palace, lower courts have had no
guidance on how to decide which of the two analyses applies to any
given case. This debate is akin to the issue in tort law of whether res
295. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 260 (1989) (White, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (distinguishing Price Waterhouse, a “mixed-motives” case
in which multiple factors may have motivated the adverse employment decision,
from pretext cases like McDonnell Douglas, which involve discrimination driven by one
“true” motive); id. at 270–71 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (justifying a
departure from the McDonnell Douglas framework when a plaintiff presents direct
evidence that the employer relied substantially on factors forbidden under Title VII).
296. Under the now defunct Price Waterhouse mixed-motives analysis, the plaintiff
bears the burden of showing that the employer’s discrimination was partly motivated
by an unlawful reason. If the plaintiff succeeds, the burden then shifts to the
defendant to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it would have made
the same decision without relying on the unlawful reason. Only after carrying this
burden could the defendant avoid a finding of liability. Id. at 258 (majority opinion);
see also Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 93 (2003) (defining a “mixed-motive”
case as involving both legitimate and illegitimate reasons for discrimination).
297. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006).
298. Id. § 2000e-5(g)(B).
299. See Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 851–54 (9th Cir. 2002)
(highlighting the confusion among courts over the appropriate application of the
McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis and Price Waterhouse mixed-motives analysis), aff’d,
539 U.S. 90 (2003); Martin J. Katz, Unifying Disparate Treatment (Really), 59 HASTINGS
L.J. 643, 647 (2008) (tracing the dividing line between direct and circumstantial
evidence—and thus mixed-motives and pretext analyses—to Justice O’Connor’s
concurrence in Price Waterhouse).
300. Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 101 (lowering the bar from direct evidence to
“sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude, by a preponderance of the
evidence” that an unlawful motivation factored into an employer’s decision making).
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ipsa may be applied in cases in which direct evidence of
breach/nonbreach is available.301
b. The overarching theme: A tool for plaintiffs becomes a straightjacket
for litigants and a distraction from consideration of substantive
discrimination issues
As the Supreme Court and lower courts have tinkered with the res
ipsa analysis of employment discrimination law and created an
alternative analysis to evaluate some undefined subset of individual
disparate treatment claims, it has become increasingly clear that the
McDonnell Douglas analysis has lost the positive aspects of res ipsa
loquitur, while the negative characteristics of res ipsa have been
replicated and exacerbated. The three-stage structure has become a
shibboleth that courts dare not fail to recite, but all the while, courts
remain unconvinced that a prima facie case and pretext sufficiently
indicate discriminatory motivation.
The elements of the prima facie case and pretext, the stages of the
pretext analysis on which the plaintiff bears the burden of
production, are the analogues of the predicate facts for application of
res ipsa. The McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis is not about whether
discrimination occurred but about issues that may lead to an
inference of discrimination.302 The prima facie case, with its varying
elements, is particularly weak and courts progressively have come to
suspect that it indicates little about the ultimate issue of
discrimination.303 Thus, over its forty years, the res ipsa loquitur of
employment discrimination law has become an exemplar of a
phenomenon described by Professor Suzanna Sherry in which old
and established legal doctrines seemingly change abruptly
(analogized to earthquakes) when in reality what has occurred is that
the foundational facts embedded within them and on which the
301. See supra Parts II.A.3.
302. The Supreme Court expressed the idea this way: “In a Title VII case, the
allocation of burdens and the creation of a presumption by the establishment of a
prima facie case is intended progressively to sharpen the inquiry into the elusive
factual question of intentional discrimination.” Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n.8 (1981); see also Sperino, Rethinking, supra note 4, at 94
(explaining that “[e]mbedded within the McDonnell Douglas inquiry are several sets of
facts that masquerade as legal standards”).
303. See Sherry, supra note 6, at 164 (explaining that plaintiffs are not required
initially to prove discriminatory intent, but instead, intent is presumed from the four
elements of the prima facie case because courts believe they give rise to an inference
of discrimination); Sperino, Discrimination Statutes, supra note 7, at 14 (listing the four
elements of proof required to establish a prima facie case: (1) that the plaintiff
belonged to a racial minority; (2) that he applied for a job and was qualified; (3) that
he was rejected; and (4) that the job remained open).
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doctrines are based have changed over time (analogized to
Hicks was an apparent
movement of the tectonic plates).304
“earthquake,” which suggests that the Supreme Court actually had
changed its belief about the foundational facts of the McDonnell
Douglas analysis.305 Professor Sherry posits that the Court might
reasonably believe that with the passage of time since the enactment
of the discrimination laws, it has become less likely that employers
intentionally discriminate on prohibited bases.306
If the courts have little confidence that the predicate facts give rise
to an inference of discrimination, then the res ipsa of employment
discrimination law is no longer performing its function, and we
would be better off simply addressing the issue of discrimination.307
Still, the framework may serve a useful purpose because some courts
will continue to believe the inference is reasonable in some cases—
that is, McDonnell Douglas will continue to serve as a useful tool for
some plaintiffs to marshal their circumstantial evidence.308 However,
the framework presents at least two other problems. First, it suffers
not just from reduced usefulness as a tool, but it has become a
hindrance, as courts recite it and require plaintiffs (and defendants)
to try to fit their evidence into it no matter how their evidence may
differ from the framework’s prescribed elements. Thus, what the
Supreme Court designed as a tool to help plaintiffs organize and
present circumstantial evidence has become a straightjacket into
which they must force their cases.309 Second, the courts (as well as
304. Sherry, supra note 6, at 145–46.
305. See id. at 165–66 (attributing the change in law to the Court’s shifting belief
that discriminatory motives cannot be assumed to drive adverse employment
decisions).
306. Id. at 164–65; see also Calloway, supra note 285, at 997–98, 1007–09 (observing
that in Hicks, the Supreme Court questioned the basic assumption that
discrimination is likely the reason behind adverse employment decisions); Okediji,
supra note 25, at 52 (stating that Hicks “reflects the subtle, but increasingly palpable,
societal conviction that race is no longer the problem that it once was at the time of
Title VII’s enactment”).
307. See Sperino, Rethinking, supra note 4, at 71, 81 (advocating for courts to
abandon the use of frameworks and directly address the substantive
discrimination inquiry).
308. The McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis can aid plaintiffs in proving
intentional discrimination using circumstantial evidence because the rationale for
importing res ipsa loquitur into employment discrimination law would still apply in
courts that continue to believe that unexplained adverse employment decisions
commonly result from discrimination. See supra note 232 and accompanying text; see
also Sperino, Rethinking, supra note 4, at 116 (“McDonnell Douglas’s core holding—that
discrimination can be shown by establishing that the employer lied about the reason
for its decision—could be an important supporting doctrine in some cases.”).
309. See Okediji, supra note 25, at 52–53 (stating that Hicks’s version of pretext
analysis “artificially constrains factfinding”); Sperino, Rethinking, supra note 4, at 71
(“[T]he key question in modern discrimination cases is often whether the plaintiff

CORBETT.OFF_TO_WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

2/28/2013 1:10 PM

UNMASKING A PRETEXT FOR RES IPSA LOQUITOR

503

commentators, litigants, employers, and others) view the proof
structures as “the thing itself,” rather than the shadow on the wall of
the cave,310 and an inordinate number of decisions and other
resources are devoted to explicating, developing, and unraveling the
proof structures.311 Viewing employment discrimination law in such a
distorted way inevitably stunts productive and innovative
development of the law because courts and others do not see the
need for reform as they focus on the framework as the manifestation
of discrimination.312
Among the many problems with the McDonnell Douglas framework,
it does not work well for discrimination cases that deviate
substantially from the most common factual scenarios of
discrimination.313
Reverse discrimination cases, as previously
discussed, do not fit well within res ipsa McDonnell Douglas because
they do not involve historically common types of discrimination.314
For example, in Burlington v. News Corp.,315 a Caucasian news anchor
was fired for causing substantial racial unrest in the workplace after
using the word “nigger” in discussions in a meeting about whether
the word should be used in a news report.316 The Caucasian plaintiff
contended that he was disciplined for a non-derogatory use of the
word, while many black employees who also used the word were not
disciplined.317 The court recognized the threshold question of which
analysis it should apply—the McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis or
can cram his or her facts into a recognized structure and not whether the facts
establish discrimination.”).
310. In the allegory of the Cave, Plato discusses a hypothetical situation in which
what someone perceives as reality is actually shadows cast on the wall of the cave by
the true objects. See Corbett, supra note 25..
311. See, e.g., Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148 (2000)
(considering the procedural effect of proving pretext); St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v.
Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993) (same).
312. See Sperino, Rethinking, supra note 4, at 86 (asserting that “[s]ince the late
1980s . . . courts have largely failed to consider new ways of thinking about
discrimination and have instead chosen to rely on the existing typology”); cf. Samuel
R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CALIF. L.
REV. 1, 47 (2006) (explaining that advocates of a structuralist approach to
employment discrimination law could contend that the alternative may “remit
workplace inequities to the increasingly outmoded tools of an employment
discrimination law designed in the 1960s and based on a very different model of
discrimination, of the workplace, and of regulation than that which prevails today”).
313. See Sperino, Discrimination Statutes, supra note 7, at 15 (observing that “[i]n
practice, McDonnell Douglas causes courts to focus on narrow visions of how
discrimination happens and therefore makes it unlikely that a plaintiff trying to
prevail on a strange scenario will survive the test”).
314. See supra notes 239–40 and accompanying text.
315. 759 F. Supp. 2d 580 (E.D. Pa. 2010).
316. Id. at 584–89.
317. Id. at 592.
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mixed-motives.318 The court said it was using both analyses, but it
posed the key question ostensibly under the pretext stage: “[C]an an
employer be held liable under Title VII for enforcing or condoning
the social norm that it is acceptable for African Americans to say
‘nigger’ but not whites?”319 Thus, the court identified the core
discrimination issue as one that actually had little to do with the
McDonnell Douglas analysis, though the issue merited careful
consideration and the court dutifully crammed it into the pretext
stage.320 Examining that issue, the court concluded that African
Americans indeed might tolerate use of the word by other African
Americans and be insulted when the word is used by white people.321
Nevertheless, the court found that even if such a social norm exists, it
is the type of discriminatory social norm that Title VII was enacted to
counter.322 The court thus identified and addressed the real issue in
the case, and the pretext analysis did nothing but clutter the opinion
and impede the analysis.
In another recent reverse discrimination case, Smith v. LockheedMartin Corp.,323 the ultimate issue focused on comparative treatment
of African-American and white employees.324 White employees were
fired for emailing a racially offensive joke, while black employees who
engaged in similar conduct were not fired.325 The court forced the
evidence into the McDonnell Douglas analysis but twice expressly
disclaimed any real operative importance of the analysis. The court
rejected the notion that satisfying the three stages of the pretext
analysis is the sine qua non of surviving summary judgment. Thus,
failure to produce a suitable comparator did not doom plaintiff’s
case. The pretext analysis merely provides guidance in resolving
whether there is a reasonable inference of discrimination.326
The Eleventh Circuit in Smith went on to find that the plaintiff
presented sufficient circumstantial evidence of racial discrimination
to avoid summary judgment.327 However, the court’s blasphemous
318. Id. at 590.
319. Id. at 596.
320. See id. (noting that the issue had not previously been decided by the
federal courts).
321. Id. at 597 (drawing upon historical context to conclude that African
Americans often use the word ironically, satirically, or affectionately, while the use of
the word by white persons often carries belittling, oppressive, and dehumanizing
undertones).
322. Id.
323. 644 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 2011).
324. Id. at 1326.
325. Id. at 1324.
326. Id. at 1346 n.86.
327. Id. at 1346–47.
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declarations regarding McDonnell Douglas would cause another court
to reassert fealty to the res ipsa analysis. A federal district court,
faced with citation to the apostasy of Smith’s departure from
McDonnell Douglas, declared as follows: “To the extent that Smith
suggests the burden-shifting paradigm of McDonnell Douglas can be
ignored in a case based on circumstantial evidence, freeing the
plaintiff from any obligation to establish a prima facie case, it is in
tension with a long line of Eleventh Circuit precedent.”328 Although
some courts diverge from the McDonnell Douglas straightjacket, most
do not. Even among those that do, virtually all feel constrained to
at least pay lip service to it.
The restrictive effect on litigation, shoving all evidence into the
three stages of the pretext analysis, and the focus of courts on the
framework rather than the real issues of discrimination are therefore
intertwined. When courts liberate themselves somewhat from the
McDonnell Douglas vise grip, as in Burlington and Smith, they are able to
identify and grapple with the actual issues of employment
discrimination.
The tenacity of res ipsa/McDonnell Douglas
In light of the weaknesses of the framework and forty years of
tinkering with it, one would think that the Supreme Court long ago
would have expelled res ipsa from employment discrimination law.
Congress presented a golden opportunity when, in the Civil Rights
Act of 1991, it codified a version of the mixed-motives analysis.329 The
Court in Desert Palace, could have sent res ipsa back to tort law rather
than leave lower courts with the conundrum of which framework
applies in a given case, but it did not.330 Notwithstanding an
outpouring of scholarship arguing that Desert Palace should have
signaled the end of McDonnell Douglas,331 it flourishes.
3.

328. Bell v. Crowne Mgmt., LLC, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1232 (S.D. Ala. 2012).
329. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m), -5(g)(2)(B) (2006).
330. See Katz, supra note 299, at 643 (noting that “when the Court had a chance to
clarify things in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, the Court made things worse, not better”);
Jamie Darin Prenkert, The Role of Second-Order Uniformity in Disparate Treatment Law:
McDonnell Douglas’s Longevity and the Mixed-Motives Mess, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 511, 512
(2008) (arguing that Desert Palace has contributed to the vitality of McDonnell
Douglas).
331. See, e.g., Michael J. Zimmer, The New Discrimination Law: Price Waterhouse Is
Dead, Whither McDonnell Douglas?, 53 EMORY L.J. 1887, 1932 (2004) (arguing that
the “motivating factor” showing should apply to all individual disparate treatment
cases because the slight differences between the McDonnell Douglas and the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 do not justify maintaining two separate analyses for individual
disparate treatment cases).

CORBETT.OFF_TO_WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

506

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2/28/2013 1:10 PM

[Vol. 62:447

When the Fifth Circuit took on the task of addressing the
question left by Desert Palace in Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., it
merged the pretext and mixed-motives analyses into what it termed
the “modified McDonnell Douglas approach,” which retained the
three stages of the pretext analysis, although they seemed
perfunctory when the court grafted the “motivating factor” standard
of mixed motives onto the third stage as an alternative to pretext.332
In another example of the resilience of McDonnell Douglas, when
bills were introduced in Congress to overturn the Supreme Court’s
decision in Gross, they expressly stated that the McDonnell Douglas
analysis was to be preserved as a way to prove discrimination under
all the employment discrimination laws.333 Thus, notwithstanding
its monumental shortcomings, the McDonnell Douglas proof
structure maintains a tenacious and powerful grip on employment
discrimination law—almost like the siren call of res ipsa loquitur
beckoning first-year law students to the perilous shoals of peripheral
issues and irrelevant discussion.
III. THROWING RES IPSA OUT OF THE EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
WAREHOUSE
Seeing the McDonnell Douglas proof structure as res ipsa helps
explain why it increasingly has served employment discrimination law
poorly. Perhaps this view of the hoary pretext analysis will provide
some added impetus for finally dispatching with it and moving to a
more appropriate and more flexible standard. Also this perspective
should encourage Congress and the courts to develop a more
deliberative and discriminating approach for incorporating tort law
into employment discrimination law. Adopting such a new approach
is important because tort law still has much to offer the younger and
relatively underdeveloped body of employment discrimination law.
Like the infamous barrel that fell from the warehouse and spawned
res ipsa loquitur, McDonnell Douglas needs to be cast out of
employment discrimination law. Although there have been many calls
to expel the McDonnell Douglas analysis, few of them have invoked its illmatched tort underpinnings as a reason.334 Judge Wood of the
Seventh Circuit, in a recent concurring opinion, called for the
abrogation of the McDonnell Douglas analysis because, although it was
332. Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 376 F. 3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2004).
333. See supra note 27 (discussing the proposed Protecting Older Workers Against
Discrimination Act, S. 2189, 112th Cong. § 2(a)(4)(E) (2012)).
334. See Prenkert, supra note 330, at 513 (noting that “a chorus of commentators
has rightfully clamored to euthanize the [McDonnell Douglas] framework”).
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designed to clarify and simplify a plaintiff’s presentation of her case,
“both of those goals have gone by the wayside.”335 Judge Wood then
declared that “[c]ourts manage tort litigation every day without the ins
and outs of these methods of proof, and I see no reason why
employment discrimination litigation . . . could not be handled in the
same straightforward way.”336
Ironically, many employment
discrimination law principles, including the McDonnell Douglas analysis,
have been borrowed from tort law.
The McDonnell Douglas proof structure’s declining performance
over four decades already has been chronicled. If the Supreme
Court had expressly recognized the analysis as at least a derivative of
res ipsa when it adopted the analysis in 1973, there were reasons
based on res ipsa’s use and track record in tort law to question
whether it was appropriate for employment discrimination law. For
one, although res ipsa was a doctrine to be used by plaintiffs to assist
them in presenting circumstantial evidence of a breach, it was a tool
of last resort for plaintiffs who could not otherwise prove a
breach.337 The Court in McDonnell Douglas seemed to understand
that it was establishing the fundamental analytical tool for
individual disparate treatment claims—the most common
employment discrimination claims.338 The pretext analysis would
not be a backup tool like res ipsa was. An analytical tool of last
resort was not designed to function as the most basic analyses of a
body of law.
Two other distinctions between the use of res ipsa in tort law and
the pretext analysis in employment discrimination also should have
raised concerns. First, the Court was adopting, without significant
modification, an analysis for intentional discrimination cases used in
torts for negligence cases.339 A number of tort doctrines distinguish
between negligence and intentional torts and impose greater
burdens on alleged intentional tortfeasors than negligent

335. Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 863 (7th Cir. 2012) (Wood, J.,
concurring).
336. Id.
337. See Okediji, supra note 25, at 84 (discussing res ipsa loquitur as a way of
proving negligence without actual proof).
338. See Sperino, Rethinking, supra note 4, at 76 (noting that the Court created the
burden-shifting test to analyze individual disparate treatment cases); cf. Zimmer,
supra note 331, at 1893 (“‘Disparate treatment’ . . . is the most easily understood type
of discrimination.” (citing Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335
n.15 (1977))).
339. See Okediji, supra note 25, at 83 (explaining that in torts, circumstantial
evidence may be sufficient to support an inference of negligence under res ipsa
loquitur).

CORBETT.OFF_TO_WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

508

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2/28/2013 1:10 PM

[Vol. 62:447

tortfeasors.340 Perhaps the Court considered that the three stages and
shifting burdens of production of the McDonnell Douglas analysis were
an adequate modification of res ipsa. However, considering the
distinction between negligence and intent, the Court might have
shifted both the burden of production and the burden of persuasion,
but it did not.341 Or the Court might have resolved the issue of what
procedural effect to attach to a showing of pretext in ways more
favorable to plaintiffs than it did in Hicks and Reeves342 Second,
whereas res ipsa usually addresses physical acts and physical injuries,
the McDonnell Douglas analysis is used to evaluate a mental state.
While courts may be readily willing to draw inferences about physical
facts based on surrogate questions, they may be less comfortable
inferring discriminatory mental states based on similar surrogate
questions.
Beyond the distinctions between torts and employment
discrimination, res ipsa did not have a sterling record of performance
in torts. There were a number of problems and uncertainties with res
ipsa in tort law,343 and those difficulties merited consideration before
res ipsa was adopted as the basic analysis for a landmark civil rights
and public policy statute.
Regardless of whether the Court should have adopted res ipsa for
employment discrimination law and whether it could have been
modified adequately to accommodate employment discrimination
law, the time has come to push the McDonnell Douglas barrel out of
the warehouse. A superior alternative is readily available. In the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Congress codified a version of the mixed-motives
analysis in Title VII.344 The plaintiff establishes a prima facie case by
demonstrating that discrimination was a motivating factor in the
employer’s decision.345 At that point, the employer is liable, but if the
340. Consider, for example, with negligence, proximate cause cuts off liability of
defendants for unforeseeable harm, whereas the principle of extended liability holds
that defendants who commit intentional torts are liable for the full extent of harm
they cause, no matter how unforeseeable. See Shades Ridge Holding Co. v. Cobbs,
Allen & Hall Mortg. Co., 390 So. 2d 601, 607 (Ala. 1980) (setting forth the policy
rationale that liability should fall on the intentional tortfeasor, rather than allow the
victim to go uncompensated).
341. See Okediji, supra note 25, at 85 (explaining that although the burden of
persuasion remains with the plaintiff under the McDonnell Douglas framework, policy
considerations ultimately dictate where the burden of persuasion lies).
342. See supra Part II.C.2(a)(i).
343. See supra Part II.A (discussing three troublesome features of res ipsa loquitor:
(1) uncertainty regarding the predicate facts that determine the applicability of res
ipsa loquitur in any given case; (2) the procedural effect of res ipsa loquitur; and (3)
uncertainty regarding the types of cases to which res ipsa loquitur is applicable).
344. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m), -5(g)(2)(B) (2006).
345. Id. § 2000e-2(m).
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employer can demonstrate (satisfy the burden of persuasion) that it
would have made the same decision for nondiscriminatory reasons,
the defendant employer can limit remedies.346 Commentators have
advocated for the replacement of the McDonnell Douglas analysis with
some version of the mixed-motives analysis, at least similar to the one
added to Title VII by the Civil Rights Act of 1991.347 That framework
resolves or ameliorates many of the problems raised by the pretext
analysis. First, the motivating factor standard does not artificially
cabin the types of evidence that must be presented by the parties as
the pretext analysis does. Second, it does not base an inference or
presumption of discrimination on presentation of evidence to satisfy
predicate issues that are surrogates for the real issue of
discrimination. Third, the motivating factor standard does not
establish an inference or presumption based on historical patterns
of discrimination that may have changed, or that courts and jurors
may think have changed, over time. In the foregoing ways and
others, the mixed-motives analysis is less rigid and more generally
appropriate than the pretext analysis, and it already has Congress’s
imprimatur for use with Title VII.
Even if McDonnell Douglas were rejected, another step would be
necessary to make the statutory mixed-motives analysis applicable to
individual disparate treatment claims under all the employment
discrimination laws. The Supreme Court in Gross defined the
statutory language “because of” as meaning but for causation and
rejected the mixed-motives analysis for age discrimination claims
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.348 Because of
346. Id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
347. See, e.g., William R. Corbett, Fixing Employment Discrimination Law, 62 SMU L.
REV. 81, 106, 108 (2009) (arguing that Congress should replace the pretext proof
structure with a version of the modified mixed-motives structure); Katz, supra note
299, at 643–44 (advocating for the framework prescribed by the Civil Rights Act of
1991, which would eliminate doctrinal confusion and unify fragmented disparate
treatment law); Prenkert, supra note 330, at 516 (urging Congress to clarify mixedmotives jurisprudence by creating a unified framework and eradicating McDonnell
Douglas); Zimmer, supra note 331, at 1891 (analyzing Desert Palace’s potential to
surpass McDonnell Douglas and give rise to a new, uniform proof structure).
348. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009). Since the Court was
interpreting the “because of” statutory language, the decision might render the
mixed-motives framework inapplicable to all discrimination statutes except Title VII,
which also has the statutory “motivating factor” language. See Serwatka v. Rockwell
Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957, 961–62 (7th Cir. 2010) (Gross holding renders mixed
motives inapplicable to Americans with Disabilities Act). But see Smith v. Xerox
Corp., 602 F.3d 320 (5th Cir. 2010) (declining to extend the holding of Gross to
antiretaliation provision in Title VII). The Supreme Court has granted certiorari to
resolve the applicability of Gross to the antiretaliation provision of Title VII. Nassar v.
Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr., 674 F.3d 448 (5th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 2013 WL
203552 (U.S. Jan. 18, 2013) (No. 12-484).
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Gross, to effectuate unification of all disparate treatment law under
mixed motives, either the Court would need to overrule the case or
Congress would have to make the mixed-motives analysis available
under all the employment discrimination statutes.349
Another issue that Congress should consider if the statutory mixedmotives analysis were to become the sole individual disparate
treatment analysis is the effect of the same-decision defense.350
Under the current Title VII defense, if a defendant satisfies the
burden of persuasion on same-decision, it will limit remedies,
eliminating all monetary remedies that would go to the plaintiff.351
Before recommending that Congress simply amend the statutes to say
that the current statutory mixed-motives analysis applies to all
individual intentional discrimination cases, it is worth asking whether
changes should be made in light of the fact that the pretext proof
structure would be gone. In the 1991 Act, Congress clearly indicated
the way in which it wished to modify the Price Waterhouse mixedmotives analysis. However, if Congress also had thought it were
abolishing the pretext analysis and replacing it with a unified analysis,
it might have done things differently, such as giving a different effect
to the same-decision defense. Thus, Congress should consider
modifications to the current statutory mixed-motives proof structure.
Congress is the better body to abrogate McDonnell Douglas than the
Supreme Court.352 Although the Court should have dispensed with
the pretext analysis in Desert Palace or thereafter, when it eradicated
the line of demarcation between cases to be analyzed under pretext
and mixed motives, the Court did not do so, and nine years after
Desert Palace, it still has not done so. Rather than removing ill-fitting
tort principles from employment discrimination law, Staub
demonstrates that the Court is inclined to forge ahead with
importation of tort law.353 Generally, the Court simply has not
expressly overruled employment discrimination precedents.354
349. The proposed Protecting Older Workers Against Discrimination Act would
do this, but it also would preserve the McDonnell Douglas analysis. S. 2189, 112th
Cong. § 2(a)(4)(E) (2012).
350. Corbett, supra note 347, at 107.
351. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B); Corbett, supra note 347, at 106.
352. See Martin J. Katz, Gross Disunity, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 857, 889 (2010)
(commenting that “given the Court’s apparent hostility to unification . . . unification
will need to come from Congress”).
353. See supra notes 32–44 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme
Court’s adoption of the highly-criticized doctrine of proximate cause in Staub).
354. See Lemos, supra note 6, at 427 (observing that “[i]f judged by the rate of
outright reversals, the Court’s decisions in the Title VII arena have been
exceptionally stable: not once in the history of Title VII has the Court overruled a
prior opinion”).
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Furthermore, if the pretext analysis were thrown out of the
warehouse, there are issues that Congress needs to consider in
refining the replacement mixed-motives framework. Removing the
McDonnell Douglas analysis should substantially improve employment
discrimination law.
That important step also might prompt
consideration of the general issue of tortification of employment
discrimination law. But that is an issue for another day.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s latest foray into tortification of employment
discrimination law in Staub is alarming. However, one can only guess
how the concept of proximate cause will develop in discrimination law.
The McDonnell Douglas/pretext framework, which is a thinly veiled
version of res ipsa loquitur, has a forty-year track record. Whether res
ipsa should have been imported into discrimination law with only
minor modifications in 1973 is debatable. Regardless, during its
tenure, it has suffered from declining performance, it has mangled
cases, and it has impeded the innovative development of employment
discrimination law. The time has come to reject this pretext for res
ipsa loquitur and let employment discrimination speak for itself.

